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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The trial court entered its Ruling and Order denying Brooke Robinson's (hereinafter
"Mother") Rule 59 Motion to Amend Order on April 30, 2015. Rec. 1238. Mother timely
filed her Notice of Appeal on May 21, 2015. Rec. 1241. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code § 78A-4-l 03(2)(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I.

Issue:

Did the trial court err in granting the Respondent's (hereinafter

"Father") motion to dismiss Mother's petition and specifically, in finding that Utah's courts
did not have jurisdiction under the Utah Unifonn Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (hereinafter "UUCCJEA"), Utah Code § 78B-l 3-101 et seq. (2008), to
adjudicate the issues contained in Mother's petition?
a.

Standard of Review. "Both jurisdictional questions and questions of

statutory interpretation are questions of law that we review for correctness." In re P.F.B.,
2008 UT App 271, 191 P.3d 49; Meyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT App 364, 196 P.3d 604,606.

b.

Preservation Below. Mother contended throughout the proceeding that

the court had jurisdiction to hear the Petition under the UUCCJEA and that the order
dismissing the case based upon the lack of jurisdiction was error. Rec. 272, 381, 386, 937
and 944.
2.

Issue:

Did the trial court err in concluding, without an evidentiary hearing

and without communicating with the courts in Mexico, that at the time of the filing of the
Petition in this case, there were existing orders and continuing child custody proceedings in

Mexico and that Mother had engaged in unjustifiable misconduct by leaving Mexico with the
children and changing her name in response to mental and physical abuse by Father?
a.

Standard of Review. ''Both jurisdictional questions and questions of

statutory interpretation are questions of law that we review for correctness." In re P.F.B.,
2008 UT App 2 71, 191 P .3d 49; Meyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT App 3 64, 196 P .3d 604, 606.
Only if it is clear that the claimant is not entitled to relief under any state of facts that could
be proven to support the claim should a motion to dismiss be granted. Colman v. Utah State

Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, P9, 99 P.3d
842, 846, 508 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 2004).
b.

Preservation Below. Mother repeatedly contended that, at the time the

petition was filed, there were no simultaneous custody proceedings pending in Mexico and
that the previously entered orders issued in Mexico's courts relating to the children had been
rescinded and vacated by the issuing court. Rec. 272, 381, 386, 937 and 944.
3.

Issue: Did the court err in failing to make sufficient findings of fact to support

its conclusion that the provisions of the UUCCJEA precluded the exercise of jurisdiction in
this matter, that there were simultaneous custody proceedings pending in Mexico and that
Mother had engaged in unjustifiable misconduct?
a.

Standard of Review. For findings of fact to be adequate, they "must

show that the com1's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by, the
evidence.' The findings 'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."'

2

Acton v. Deliran, 73 7 P .2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted);
Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, il 28, 70 P.3d 35, 43.
b.

Preservation Below. Mother argued that the court had failed to set out

sufficient findings to identify the evidence upon which it was relying to establish that there
were simultaneous custody proceedings pending in Mexico at the time Mother filed her
Petition in this case. Rec. 93 7, 944.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
The following sections of the UUCCJEA are attached in Addendum G: Utah Code
§ 78B-13-102 (definitions);§ 78B-13-110 (communication between courts),§ 78B-13-112
(cooperation between courts); § 78B-13-201 (initial jurisdiction); § 78B-13-206
(simultaneous proceedings); § 78B-13-208 (jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct); and
§ 78B-13-209 (Infonnation to be submitted to court).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case & Course of the Proceedings Below
Mother commenced this action seeking orders related to the custody, maintenance

and support of the parties' two minor children. Although the parties have been separated
since November 2007, there are no currently enforceable orders in place, either in Mexico
or the United States, regarding the custody of the minor children or provisions thereof
providing for their maintenance and support. Additionally, there are currently no orders in
place protecting Mother and children from the psychological, physical and emotional
vb

misconduct of Father.

3

This appeal arises from a final order upholding the recommendation of the domestic
relations commissioner dismissing the Mother's petition for custody related orders based
upon a lack of jurisdiction under the provisions of the UUCCJEA.

~

Specifically, the

commissioner held that at the time the petition was filed in this case, there were pending
custody proceedings in Mexico; and, even if Utah had jurisdiction, Mother had engaged in
unjustifiable misconduct justifying Utah's refusal to exercise jurisdiction in the matter.
On November 18, 2013, Mother filed her petition requesting the entry of custody and
related orders pertaining to the parties' minor children. Rec. 1-57.
In her petition, Mother alleged that the parties were married on June 26, 1999 and that
as issue of the marriage, two children were born: S.M.L., born May 2001, and R.M.L, born
November 2003. Rec. 1-57.
Mother alleged that Father, in November 2007, instituted an action for divorce in a
court in Mexico which produced a number of orders related to custody, the last significant
of which was the order of June 30, 2010, granting Mother sole custody or "custodia
definitiva" (See Addendum A, pp. 4-6; Addendum E). Both parties appealed the June 30 th
order and while that original divorce/custody case was on appeal, Father filed a separate
action with another court in Mexico, seeking only a no-fault divorce decree (See Addendum
A, pp. 4-6; Addendum F). The court in which the no-fault action was filed granted a decree
of divorce to the parties on November 25, 2010. Rec. 8-10, Addendum F; Rec. 86, 90. The
decree did not adjudicate any other issues attendant to a divorce including rights with regard

4

~

to the custody of the children and did not reserve any right to do so. Rec. 8-10, 86, 90,
Addendum F.
When the judge in the original divorce/custody action in Mexico was advised of the
filing of the separate no-fault action that had circumvented the jurisdiction of the court in the
original divorce/custody action, that judge entered an order on February 8, 2013, dismissing
the original divorce/custody action in its entirety and rescinding and nullifying all prior
orders relating to custody and visitation. Rec. 1-7, 11-16, Addendum E.
Mother, after she had been awarded sole custody in Mexico and believing that all
restrictions against her leaving Mexico had been lifted, left Mexico and traveled with the
children to Utah County, Utah in December 2010, where they have resided to this day. Rec.
1-6, 272-299, Addendum F (pp. 4-5 thereof). Mother left Mexico with the children, traveled
to Utah and changed her name in response to emotional and physical abuse at the hands of
Father. Rec. 54, 458-470, 481-190.
After the February 8, 2013 order dismissing the original divorce/custody case in
Mexico, there were no other proceedings pending in Mexico. Accordingly Mother alleged
in her petition that at the time of the filing of her petition in Utah (11/8/2013), there were no
custody proceedings pending in any other court in the U.S. or Mexico and that Utah had been
the home state of the children since December, 20 I 0. Rec. 1-6.

Accordingly Mother

contended that Utah had jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition under the UUCCJEA. Rec.
1-6, 272-299, 381-85, 386-409.

5

On June 12, 2014, Father filed a motion to dismiss the petition alleging that "there are
existing custody determinations in Mexico and ongoing proceedings there." Rec. 81, 86, 98.
Yet Father acknowledged in his supporting memorandum:
The last custody determination entered by the Mexican family court on
February 8, 2013, revoked each and every one of the prior orders that gave
Mother any superior custody right to that of Father. ...
Rec. 86, 99.
On July 17, 2014, Mother filed a comprehensive memorandum in opposition to
Father's motion to dismiss demonstrating, by the production of the actual orders from the
courts in Mexico, that both actions in Mexico had been concluded or dismissed and that there
were no active cases or enforceable custody orders issued therefrom. Rec. 272-332.
On October 15, 2014, Father filed a reply brief in support of his motion to dismiss
essentially abandoning the allegation that either the original divorce/custody case or the nofault proceeding were still pending or had produced any enforceable order relating to the
custody of the children. Rec. 341-42. Father emphasized instead the theory that a criminal
proceeding against Mother for allegedly abducting the children constituted a "child custody
proceeding" under the UUCCJ EA. Rec. 341, 343-44.
On October 20, 2014, Commissioner Thomas Patton heard oral arguments and
recommended that the petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The commissioner,
without specific findings or citations to particular orders or documents, found that there was
an active proceeding in Mexico related to custody of the children and that the Mother had

6
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engaged in unjustifiable misconduct. Rec. 377. An order embodying the recommendation
was entered on December 5, 2014. Rec. 853.
Mother filed an objection to the commissioner's recommendation with supporting
memorandum and filed a request for oral argument and hearing on November 3, 2014. Rec.
381-85, 386-492, 493-94.
On March 2, 2015, Mother filed a motion for the court to take judicial notice of the
filing of an entirely new action by Father in Mexico in February 2014 (after the petition in
this case had been filed (11/18/2013)) seeking a custody determination and supportive orders.
Rec. 895-897, 898-913.

The new filing by Father in Mexico clearly demonstrated that

neither of the two previously filed actions in Mexico were active or could be used to facilitate
adjudication of the custody of the parties' minor children. Id.
On March 5, 2015, Judge Christine Johnson conducted oral arguments on Mother's
objection and upheld the Commissioner's recommendation. Rec. 916. An order reflecting
the ruling was entered on March 17, 2015. Rec. 931.
Mother filed a motion under Rules 52 and 59 to amend the order on March 31, 2015.
Rec. 937-943, 944-1110. Father filed a response on April 14, 2015. Rec. 1147. On April 30,
2015, the court entered its ruling and order denying the Mother's motion. Rec. 1238.
Mother filed a notice of appeal on May 21, 2015. Rec. 1241.

7

B.

Statement of Facts
I.

Facts Alleged in Verified Petition of the Mother.

Mother filed a verified petition alleging the facts required to invoke the court's
jurisdiction under the UUCCJEA.
1.

In her petition filed on November 18, 2013, Mother alleged that she and the

parties two children had been residents of Utah County, State of Utah since December 2010
(nearly three years). Rec. 1-7.
2.

The Mother and minor children are dual citizens of the United States and

Mexico. Father is a citizen of Mexico. Id.
3.

Mother and Father were married in Mexico on June 26, 1999 and had two

children born as issue of the marriage, to wit: S.M.L., born May 2001; and, R.M.L, born
November 2003. During the course of the marriage Mother was the primary caretaker of the
children. Id.
4.

There were two actions filed in Mexico that related to the marriage of the

parties. The first or main action involved proceedings related to the divorce and the custody
of the minor children. There were numerous hearings and orders issued by the court in that
original divorce/custody action. Rec. 1-6, 272-332, Addendum A (pp. 4-6) and E. 1 The most
significant order was dated June 30, 2010. It represented a final custody order, granting

1

A detailed summary of the facts relating to the original divorce/custody case in
Mexico is set out below as part of the narrative relating to the Hague Convention proceeding
initiated by Father.
8

Mother "custodia definitiva" or sole custody subject to Father's limited supervised visitation
rights. Rec. 272-332, Addendum A (pp. 4 -6). Father appealed the June 30,2010 order. Id.
5.

While that original divorce/custody action was proceeding, the law changed

in Mexico and allowed the filing of a no-fault divorce. Because Father had been unable to
establish grounds for divorce in the original divorce/custody case, he filed a separate divorce
action in Mexico in another court invoking the no-fault law. That court granted the parties
a divorce on November 25, 2010. Rec. 1-7, 8-10, Addendum A. 2
6.

When it became apparent that Father had circumvented the authority of the

original divorce/custody case by seeking a no-fault decree in another court, the judge in the
original divorce/custody case entered an order on February 8, 2013, dismissing the action and
specifically rescinding all prior orders issued in the case relating to the divorce, custody and
visitation. Rec. 1-7, 12-16, 272-332, 381-409, Addendum E.
7.

Because Father had and continued to be physically, mentally and verbally

abusive to Mother and the children, Mother left Mexico with the children and moved to
Orem, Utah in December 2010 and they have resided in Utah since that time. Rec. 1-7, 54,
272-299, 458-70, 481-90. At the time Mother left Mexico she believed that all restrictions
on her leaving Mexico had been lifted and that there was no legal prohibition from her
leaving. Id., Addendum A (p. 5).

2

The Decree of Divorce recited that it was final and conclusive for all legal purposes
and made no order relating to the custody of the children and did not provide any mechanism
for such issues to be brought before that court in the future. Id.
9

8.

Mother acknowledges that Father caused a criminal proceeding to be

commenced in Mexico based upon her leaving the country with the children that resulted in
extradition proceedings c01mnenced in the United States. Rec. 1, 4, 272-299, 443-45. Mother
is actively defending those accusations in Mexico and is in full compliance with the orders
of the court handling the criminal allegations. Id. Importantly, Mother is not charged with
taking the children out of Mexico in violation of a court order or court restriction emanating
from the divorce action. Rather, she is charged with leaving Mexico with the children in
violation of Father's general or common law custodial rights. Rec. 86, 139-148.
9.

Father filed a Petition for Immediate Return of Children to pursuant to the

Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 2: 13CV422 DAK. Rec.
18-52, Addendum A. The petition was assigned to United States District Judge Dale A.
Kimball. After extensive briefing and factual proceedings including interviews with the
children, Judge Kimball entered extensive findings of fact and denied Father's petition by
order dated August 5, 2013. Rec. 18-52, Addendum A.
II.

I 0.

Facts Alleged in Father's Motion to Dismiss.

Aside from including Judge Kimball's findings from the Hague Convention

proceedings, Father does not dispute the material allegations made by Mother in her petition.
Rec. 81, 86
11.

(iii!

1-4, 6, 14, 21, 23-24).

Father acknowledges that the original divorce/custody action in Mexico was

filed in October 2007. Rec. 86,

ii

6. Father further acknowledges that while the original

10
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divorce/custody was on appeal from the June 30, 2010 order granting Mother sole custody
of the parties minor children, he filed a no-fault proceeding in another court seeking a decree
of divorce. Id., atilil 11-13.
12.

Father claims however, that the Court in the no-fault case, when it entered the

decree of divorce, reserved the right for further litigation of child custody. Id. Father cannot
identify any language in the November 25, 2010 no-fault divorce decree reserving those
issues or contemplating any further hearings Id. See also, Rec. 1, Addendum A.
13.

Father does not allege that in the five years since the no-fault decree has been

entered in Mexico, he has been able to reopen the proceedings in the no-fault case or the
original divorce/custody action to seek further orders of the court regarding custody or
enforcement of any of the prior orders that were rescinded and recalled. Rec. 81, 86.
14.

As it relates to the original divorce/custody action filed in Mexico, Father does

not contest Mother's allegation that the court, on February 8, 2013, upon hearing about the
no-fault action, dismissed the entire case and rescinded all orders previously entered by that
court. Rec. 86,
15.

~

21, 110.

Further Father impliedly concedes that both the no-fault proceeding and the

original divorce/custody case were concluded without continuing orders regarding custody
and that they cannot be reopened, in disclosing that he had to file a new action in Mexico on

1I

March 27, 2014 (after Mother's petition had been filed on l 1/18/2013) to try and obtain a
custody order in Mexico. Rec. 86,
16.

ii 29, 895, 898. 3

Father has not produced any order under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act

(UF JA), Utah Code§§ 78B-5-301 to 788-5-307(2012), demonstrating any on-going custody
proceeding in Mexico that predated the filing of the petition in this case.

III.

Facts Identified in the Hague Convention Proceedings.

Facts found by Judge Kimball in the Hague Convention 4 case that relate to the subject
matter of this action can be summarized as follows: Rec. 1, 17, 86, 110, 125, 139, Addendum

A.
17.

Father instituted an action under the Hague Convention on June 7, 2013, to

obtain an order returning the parties' minor children to him. Addendum A ( p.1 ). The court's
role, in that proceeding, was not to make a traditional custody detennination but "to
detennine in what jurisdiction the children should be physically located so that the proper
jurisdiction can make those custody decisions." Id. at p. 2.

3

The filing of the new action in Mexico on March 27, 2014, was four months after the
petition was filed in this case by Mother and establishes that at the time the petition was filed
in this case, there were no custody proceedings pending or orders in place in Mexico.
4

The Hague Convention has been implemented in the United States by the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U .S.C. §§ 11601-11610. The Hague
Convention was adopted to protect children from the adverse effects of being wrongfully
removed to or retained in a foreign country and to establish procedures for their return. See
Matas-Vidal v. Lihhey-Aguilera, No. 2: 13-cv-422 OAK, 2013 Dist. Lexis 110630, 2013 WL
3995300 (D. Utah Aug. 5, 2013).
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18.

There appears to have been significant discord in the man-iage of the parties

for many years. Id. at p. 4. Father filed for divorce in early October 2007 in Mexico City. 5
An order was entered ban-ing the removal of the children from Mexico on October 16, 2007.
On December 14, 2007, Mother was granted physical custody of the children and Father was
only given three hours a day of supervised visitation on alternate Saturdays and Sundays. Id.
19.

On June 30, 2010, the court issued an order granting "custodia definitiva" or

sole custody to Mother. The parties disputed whether the award was one of sole custody and
whether the order dissolved any ban on leaving the country. Id. at p. 5. In August 2010,
Father appealed the June 30, 2010 order. Id.
20.

While the order of June 30,2010 issued in the Thirty-Six Court was on appeal

as described above, Father filed a separate action in the Superior Court of Justice for the
Federal District, Domestic Affairs, Twenty-Fourth court, File No. 1529/2010. This action
sought a no-fault divorce and was filed prior to September 20, 2010. 6 Id., See also, Rec. 1,
17.
21.

On November 25, 2010, the court hearing the no-fault divorce, granted the

parties a divorce. As it relates to the other issues in the divorce, the court's order states:

5

The action for divorce was filed by Father in Mexico City, in the Superior Court for
the Federal District, Domestic Affairs, Thirty-Six Court, File No. 1472/2007.
6

When the original divorce was filed by Father in Mexico, the law required him to
allege and prove grounds for divorce. Father from 2007 to 20 IO was unable to establish
grounds for the granting of a divorce from Mother. Prior to the filing of the second action
by Father, the law in Mexico changed and allowed for a no-fault divorce. Father filed the
second action presumably to take advantage of the change in the law.
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"with respect to the proposal and counterproposal of a settlement agreement submitted by the
parties, their rights are left in tact so that, if any, they may exercise their rights by filing an
ancillary proceeding." Addendum A and F. The court did not enter any order relating to the
minor children of the parties and did not leave the case open for subsequent action with
regard to custody. Id.
22.

No part of the November 25,2010 no-fault decree dealt with or rendered orders

relating to child custody or visitation. The no-fault decree was the final order in that case.
Id.

23.

In December 2010, Mother and the children left Mexico and went directly to

Orem, Utah where the children were enrolled in school on December 21, 2010. Rec. 1-7,
45 8-4 70, 481-49, Addendum A. Mother believed that all prohibitions against her leaving
Mexico with the children had been withdrawn. Id.
24.

On February 8, 2013, the judge in the original divorce/custody case,

1472/2007, issued an order dismissing that action, citing the conduct of the Father in filing
the ancillary no-fault divorce action. The judge in the 2007 filing set aside all prior orders
in the original divorce/custody case and dismissed the original divorce/custody case in its
entirety. Rec. 1-7, Addendum E. After the date of that order, there was no pending actions
for divorce and no orders relating to custody of the children, alimony, property settlement or
any other related issues in Mexico. Additionally, there were no orders of the two courts in
Mexico restricting Mother's right to take the children out of Mexico. Rec. 1-7.
25.

In addition to the findings detailed above, the Judge Kimball court found:
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A.

The Petitioner upon arriving in Utah in December 2010, enrolled the
children in school on December 21,2010 and that the children had been
enrolled in the same school since that time. Id., p. 5.

B.

Teachers and administrators at the children's school had repeatedly
noted their good behavior and academic excellence. The children are
both on a competitive swim team. SM-L was a cub scout and now
participates regularly as a boy scout. He is also on a soccer team. RML is a cub scout. Both were baptized as members of the LDS faith. Id.

C.

Petitioner began working for the Provo School District on March 7,
2011 and she has remained gainfully employed with the district since
that time.

Addendum A
26.

Two psychological reports were prepared in Mexico, one in 2008 and one in

20 I 0, but not filed until 2011. Id. , at pp. 5-6. The reports are at variance with one another,
even though they were prepared by the same person. The first report recommends that
Mother should have custody. The second report makes no recommendation as to custody.
Id. Mother had already left Mexico by the time the second report was submitted to the court.
Id.

27.

Judge Kimball found that the Father's "patria potestas" or common law

"parental authority" under general Mexican law are rights of custody under the Hague
Convention and that the removal of the children in December 2010 from Mexico violated
those rights of Father. Id. at pp. 7-8.
28.

Judge Kimball made no findings as to whether any order of a court in Mexico

was in place when the petition in this case was file or whether there was any pending action
in Mexico where the custody issue was before a tribunal. Id
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29.

In refusing to order the children of the parties to return to Mexico, Judge

Kimball relied upon the "well-settled" exception, Article 12 of the Hague Convention. Id.,
pp. 10-11 ). In applying this exception, Judge Kimball stated:
In the instant case, SM-L and RM-L have been in Utah since late December,
2010-for over two and one-half years. The court finds that they are both very
well settled. And given the boys' ages, 12 and 9 ½, respectively, these thirtyplus months have been meaningful to the boys. They have been consistently
enrolled in school since January 2011. They have missed very few days during
those two school years, and their academic success has been remarkable. Both
boys have many friends, caring neighbors, and fellow LDS church members
with whom they have formed close bonds. Their maternal grandmother also
frequently cares for them. The children are active in their church, in boy scouts
(or cub scouts for RM-L), and they are on a competitive swim team.SM-Lis
also on a soccer team. Many friends and neighbors have provided glowing
letters about Respondent and the boys, and attesting to the boys' happiness and
stable environment. Their mother has also been consistently employed since
March 2011 and appears to be financially stable. They boys both speak fluent
English and appear to have adjusted well to their living situation. Given the
outpouring of support for the boys and Respondent, both in terms of having
friends and neighbors attend the two court hearings and in submitting letters
to the court, the court has no question that these two boys are surrounded by
a loving and supportive community and that the boys are thriving in their
current environment. They are indeed settled in their new environment. ...
FN 61: For example, their school principal has written a glowing review of
both boys, stating, among other things, that "they both are among the very best
behaved and well-mannered students I have known in school during my 13
years as a teacher and 15 years as a public school administrator. They have
excellent attendance, including never being tardy to school the entire past year,
and they have never required any attendant or behavior interventions from the
school or their teachers." In addition, he stated that both "regularly are
recognized and receive awards in our quarterly recognition celebrations for
going "above and beyond" in numerous ways, and in every way they are
exemplary students and citizens." He also notes that "they are thriving and
happy in school, and they are well on their way to being happy, productive,
and successful citizens. I have absolutely no concerns about them or their well. ..... "
b emg
Id.

16

30.

Judge Kimball also relied on Article 13 of the Convention which provides that

a court may also refuse to order the return of the children if it finds that the children object
to being returned and have attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate
to take account of their views. The children are now more than two years older and do not
want to return to Mexico. The court made extensive findings on this issue:
In this case, SM-Lis twelve-years old and will start seventh grade next month.
RM-L will be ten-years old in three months and will soon start fourth grade.
The court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and maturity of both
children during the court's in camera interview of each of them. Undoubtedly
the task of meeting alone with a federal judge and his staff, with no parents or
attorneys present, was a daunting one, but both boys faced the situation
courageously. They both demonstrated a high level of maturity in answering
the court's questions-answering the questions in an articulate, thoughtful, and
respectful manner. They are both good students with strong academic records.
They both expressed a strong desire to remain in Utah and had particular
objections to returning to Mexico. They confirmed that they enjoy going to
school here, they are involved in church and several sports activities, and they
have many friends here. Indeed, both boys became visibly distraught when the
court discussed the court's task of evaluating whether they should be returned
to Mexico. The response of both boys appeared to be purely genuine-not
concocted or rehearsed in any way. Additionally, the boys were adamant about
not wanting to have a supervised visit their father while he was in town for the
instant court proceeding.
Accordingly, the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the boys
are of an appropriate age and maturity such that it is appropriate for the court
to take into account their desire to not return to Mexico ....
Here, the court recognizes that the boys have spent the past two years solely
with their mother and maternal grandmother, and that this circumstance has
undoubtedly had an impact on their desire to stay with their mother in Utah.
It is also possible that their mother has negatively colored the boys' view of
their father. Here, while the children's objections to returning to Mexico could
be due to the mother's possible undue influence over them, the court finds that
this possible undue influence is not the only reason the children desire not to
return to Mexico, and thus, the court declines to ignore their wishes. The
children appear to be genuinely happy and thriving in their current situation.
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The court has attempted to balance this possible undue influence against other
reasons the boys desire to stay here and concludes that even though the mother
has perhaps exerted some undue influence on the boys, the court should still
take into account the children's wishes to remain in Utah and not be returned
to Mexico. For this independent reason, the comt declines to return them to Mexico.

Id., pp. 14-15.
31.

Importantly, Judge Kimball concluded:
The court, however, is convinced that the return of these children to
Mexico City at this time and under these circumstances-however wrongfully
the circumstances have arisen-would severely traumatize these children. The
court emphasizes that this decision has a limited purpose and effect. It does not
mean that Petitioner cannot exercise his visitation rights with his children. It
merely establishes that the boys will not be returned to Mexico but will remain
in Utah for any custody proceedings that are initiated here. In light of the
pending Extradition proceedings against Respondent, however, the future
remains uncertain for this family. (Emphasis added)

Id.

31.

Father appealed the decision of Judge Kimball but the appeal was dismissed.
IV.

32.

Findings of the Lower Court.

The court's findings in the Order of Dismissal dated 12/5/2014 (Addendum B),

that are relevant to this appeal include:
9.

The Court finds that Mexico had jurisdiction in October 2007 when
child custody proceedings were initiated in the 36 th Court of Family
Matters in the Federal District of Mexico in case number 1427/2007
and that the subsequent bifurcation in the 24 th Court of Family Matters
in the Federal District of Mexico in case number 1529/20 IO further
confinned that jurisdiction and reserved the patties custodial rights as
subject to further litigation therein in November 20 I 0.

I 0.

Mexico reserved the right to enter additional order regarding the
custody of these children, and no Mexico court has vacated that order
or otherwise unreserved the right to conclude custody proceedings
there ...
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12.

Mexico had child custody jurisdiction. It had jurisdiction over both
parties, it had home-state jurisdiction over the children, and it had
jurisdiction of the child custody action pending before it. Such
jurisdiction is continuing and exclusive in nature. Mexico never gave
up or abandoned it [sic] jurisdiction over its prior orders or the various
proceedings that remain pending there.

16.

If Mother desires to modify the parties existing custodial rights, as
articulated in the orders from Mexico, she must seek such modification
in the courts in Mexico ... Father continues to reside in Mexico, and the
courts there retain continuing jurisdiction over modification of their
orders ...

18.

Additionally, criminal charges of Child Trafficking have been pending
against Mother .... Mother fails to acknowledge that the criminal case
... is a further exercise and manifestation of Mexico's continuing
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct custody proceedings under the
UCCJEA, and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain
simultaneous proceedings until such criminal charges are resolved,
pursuant to Utah Code 78-13-206.

19.

If convicted of the pending criminal charges in Mexico, Mother's
parental rights will be terminated . . . Consequently, Utah lacks the
authority to conduct simultaneous child custody proceedings until-at
the very least-Mother's Child Trafficking criminal charges are
resolved.

20.

Alternatively, even if this Court had a basis to exercise jurisdiction it
declines to do so as a result of Mother's unjustifiable conduct. .. It is
uncontested that Mother fled the territorial jurisdiction ofMexico when
proceedings and orders were still pending there, and that she has
refused to return or otherwise engage in the judicial process there. This
Court will not condone or otherwise overlook Mother's apparent
attempts to evade and her unwillingness to engage in the judicial
process in Mexico. Even if there were some arguable basis for
jurisdiction herein, the Cow1 will neither exercise emergency nor
general child custody jurisdiction over these children because Mother
has made every effort to avoid the jurisdiction of the courts in Mexico,
and frustrated the ability of the courts in Mexico to conclude the
custody proceedings there. In essence, Mother has engaged in
unjustifiable conduct, and she asks this Cow1 to exercise jurisdiction
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over issues she has refused to address, but that she could have pursued
and concluded in Mexico months ago. (Emphasis added)
Addendum B.
33.

The court's findings in the Order Overruling Petitioner's Objection dated

3/17/2015 (Addendum C), that are relevant to this appeal include:
3.
There are both civil and criminal proceedings in Mexico wherein the
custody of the parties' minor children and the parties' parental rights remain
at issue. This indicates to the Court that Mexico has not abandoned or
otherwise continues to exercise jurisdiction over issues of child custody.
Consequently, this Court is without and otherwise declines to assert child
custody jurisdiction..... (Emphasis added).
Addendum C.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The parties were married on June 26, 1999, Two boys were born as issue of the
marriage (ages 14 and 12). Two actions were commenced in Mexico by Father seeking the
entry of a decree of divorce and related orders.

The original divorce/custody case,

commenced in October 2007, resulted in a number of orders relating to the parties and
custody of the children. That action however was dismissed by the court in Mexico by order
dated February 8, 2013. In that same order, all previous orders relating to the custody of the
children were rescinded and nullified. There were no enforceable orders or pending
proceedings after the entry of that order. The second action in Mexico, seeking a no-fault
decree of divorce, tenninated with the entry of a divorce decree on November 25,2010. That
decree explicitly did not make any orders relating to custody or visitation with the children.
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Mother left Mexico with the children in December 20 IO after she had obtained an
order of custody in the original divorce/custody case in Mexico to escape the physical and
psychological abuse inflicted on her and the children by Father. When Mother filed her
petition in Utah on November 18, 2013, Utah had been the residence of the children for
nearly three years and there were no proceedings in Mexico or enforceable orders from any
prior proceedings.

Under the clear provisions of the UUCCJEA, Utah had jurisdiction to

hear Mother's petition and the court committed error in finding that Utah did not have
jurisdiction. Further, the court committed error in finding that at the time the petition was
filed there were proceedings regarding custody of the children pending in Mexico and/or that
there were any enforceable orders from courts in Mexico relating to the children's custody.
The court, without following the requirements of the UUCCJEA to contact the courts
in Mexico and conduct its own investigation, made inadequate and unsubstantiated factual
findings concluding that there were pending proceedings in Mexico and/or enforceable
orders therefrom.
The court misinterpreted the "simultaneous action" provision of the UUCCJEA and
held that a criminal prosecution in Mexico against Mother constituted a simultaneous action
establishing Mexico's jurisdiction.
Additionally, the court improperly concluded that Mother, who left Mexico and
changed her name to escape abuse in 20 I 0, was guilty of unjustifiable conduct in 2013, that
allowed Utah courts to defer exercising jurisdiction.
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Utah has jurisdiction to hear Mother's petition and enter orders relating to the custody
and support of the minor children. No other state or country has jurisdiction under the
UUCCJEA to hear matter related to the custody of the parties children.

ARGUMENT
I:

THE RULING THAT UTAH COURTS DO NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION UNDER THE UUCCJEA TO ADJUDICATE
MOTHER'S PETITION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

A.

The Required Predicate Facts to Establish Jurisdiction under the
UUCCJEA are Undisputed in this Case.

The lower court, in each of its three relevant orders, concluded that Utah does not
have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mother's petition but failed to identify any legal or
factual inadequacies in Mother's petition to support that conclusion (Addendum B, Order of
Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, 12/5/14; Addendum C, Order Overruling Petitioner's
Objection to Commissioner's Recmmnendation, 3/17/15; Addendum D, Ruling and Order
on Petitioner's Motion to Amend Order, 4/30/15).
The relevant undisputed facts established by the verified petition and Father's verified
memorandum in support of motion to dismiss make out the statutory requirements for
jurisdiction under the UUCCJEA. Specifically, that one of the parties and the children
resided in Utah County, Utah for more than six months prior to the filing of the petition and
that Utah was thus the "home state" of the children and that no other state or nation could
make a similar claim.
Both the petition and Father's motion to dismiss established that Father and Mother
were married in Mexico on June 26, 1999 and had two children born as issue of that
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marriage, to wit: S.M.L., born May 2001; and, R.M.L., born November 2003. The parties
were divorced by a decree entered in Mexico on November 25,2010. Mother and the minor
children have resided in Utah County, State of Utah continually from December 2010 to the
present and Utah was unquestionably the home state of the minor children on November 18,
2013, the date Mother's petition was filed with the court. Statement of Facts, supra, iii! 1-7
and 10.
The lower court conducted no evidentiary hearings and failed to make any findings
of fact that contravened the factual allegations made in Mother's verified petition and
Father's verified response. Generally, in adjudicating a motion to dismiss, the reviewing
court accepts the factual allegations in the petition as true and considers all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner. Educators

Mut. Ins. Ass 'n v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029, 1029-30 (Utah 1995)
(quoting Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991 )); see also Lowe v. Sorenson

Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989).
Accordingly, based upon the clear provisions of the UUCCJEA, Utah was
undisputably the home state of the children when the petition was filed and Mexico could not
establish jurisdiction based upon "home state" criteria. Utah Code § 78B-13-201 (2008 as
Amended).

B.

The Provisions ofthe UUCCJEA and Interpreting Case law Establish
Utah's Jurisdiction Under the Facts of this Case.

The case law establishes that both jurisdictional questions and questions of statutory
interpretation are questions oflaw that the Court reviews for correctness. In re P.F.B., 2008
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UT App 271, ,I 10, 191 P.3d 49. Under the jurisdictional sections of the UCCJEA, when
determining whether a state court has subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination, priority is given to the child's home state. See Utah Code §
788-13-201 (I). A child's home state is defined as,
... the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent
for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of
a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age,
the tenn means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the
persons mentioned.
Utah Code § 788-13-102(7). See also Meyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT App 364, 196 P.3d
604.
The statute is clear that the court of the state that "is the home state of the child on the
date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six
months before the commencement" has subject matter jurisdiction over the child custody
proceeding. Utah Code§ 788-13-201 (I )(a).
So long as there is a court that meets these home-state requirements and that court
does not decline subject matter jurisdiction based on inconvenient forum, see generally Utah
Code § 788-13-207, or unjustifiable conduct, see genera/(y Utah Code § 788-13-208, no
other state's court will have subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody
determination. See Utah Code§ 788-13-201 ( 1)(b )-( d); see also A1jo11a v. Torres, 941 So. 2d
451,455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); In re BroH'l1, 203 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App. 2006)
("[H]ome-state jurisdiction trumps all other possible bases of jurisdiction in an initial child
custody action .... "); Hatch v. Hatch (In re Kalhe.s), 2007 WI App 136, ~I 12, 302 Wis. 2d
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215, 733 N.W.2d 648 ("Under the Uniform Act, home state jurisdiction always receives
priority, and other jurisdictional bases are available only when there is no home state, or
where the home state declines jurisdiction.").
The undisputed facts in this case establish the jurisdictional requirements of the
statute-specifically that the minor children lived with Mother in Utah County, Utah for more
than six months prior to the filing of the petition. The statute is clear: "[a] court of this state
has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if: (a) this state is the
home state on the date of the commencement of the proceeding . . . . " Utah Code §
788-13-20 I ( I )(a). Further, although Father's briefing suggested that Mexico had some kind
of continuing jurisdiction, Father failed to produce a single document wherein the courts of
Mexico conducted proceedings after the February 8, 2013 order dismissing the original
divorce/custody case in Mexico, or produce an order evidencing Mexico's continuing
jurisdiction over the custody of the parties' children.
The trial court failed to review and adjudicate the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
in accordance with the statute and interpreting case law and committed clear error in holding
that Utah did not have jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The com1s made no findings as to
home state and further made no findings as to what facts established that Mexico had issued
a valid and enforceable original order regarding custody and/or was exercising some kind of
continuing jurisdiction under the UUCCJ EA.
Accordingly, the orders of the lower court on jurisdiction should be reversed.
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II:

THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT, AT THE TIME
THE PETITION WAS FILED, THERE WERE SIMULTANEOUS
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS IN MEXICO.

The court committed error in concluding that at the time Mother's petition was filed
(11/18/2013), there were simultaneously occurring custody proceedings in Mexico, thus

prohibiting Utah from exercising jurisdiction in the matter. Utah Code§ 788-13-206 (2008
as amended). See, Addendum 8, C and D.
A.

The Evidence That There were no Simultaneous Custody Proceedings
in Mexico at the Time Mother's Petition was Filed is Clear and
Convincing.

As established above, there is no evidence that, at the time of the filing of the petition
in this case, there was an existing original order regarding the children in Mexico or that
there were pending court proceedings in Mexico related to custody.
The UCCJEA imposes on the parties the duty of providing in their first pleading or,
in an attached affidavit, under oath, a statement as to whether the party has participated, as
a party or witness, in other proceedings concerning the custody of the children and if so, the
party is required to provide the identity of the court, the case number of the proceeding and
the date of the identified child custody proceeding. 7 Utah Code§ 788-13-209 (1) - (4)
(2008). The court has the power to stay an action until the relevant information relating to

ancillary proceedings is provided. Id. lmp011antly, if a party responds in the affirmative to

7

"Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical
custody, or parent-time with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for
divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of
parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear." Utah
Code§ 788-13-102(4) (2008).
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having infonnation relating to another custody proceeding, the party is obligated to provide
the court, under oath, any and all details pertinent to the court's jurisdiction. Id. Finally, each
party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in or out of the state that
could affect the present proceeding. Id.
The evidence provided to the court, through the disclosures of the parties,

1s

summarized as follows.

1.

Main Mexico Divorce/Custody Action.

Father filed for divorce against Mother in Mexico City in early October 2007. The
action was filed in the Superior Court for the Federal District, Domestic Affairs, Thirty-Six
Court, File No. 1472/2007. That case produced multiple orders relating to the custody of the
children including the orders of 10/17/2007, 12/11/2007, 6/30/2010. Statement of Facts,

supra, iii! 4-6, 10-16, Addendum A, pp. 4-6.
In the June 30, 2010 order, the court in Mexico entered a final custody order granting
Mother sole custody or "custodia definitiva." Id. See also, Rec. 86, 88-89. Mother further
contended that the same order dissolved any restrictions on her travel outside Mexico.
Addendum Exhibit A, p. 5.
In August 20 I 0, both Mother and Father appealed the June 30, 2010 order entered in
the divorce action. While the original divorce/custody case was on appeal, Father filed the
no-fault divorce case summarized below.

Because the original divorce/custody case had

adjudicated or was in the process of resolving all the other issues attendant to a divorce,
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Father sought only a decree of divorce in the no-fault proceedings. A decree of divorce was
entered in that no-fault separate action on November 25, 20 I 0. Rec. 1-7, Addendum F.
On January 7, 2011, the Mexican appeals court reversed the June 30, 2010 order.
Addendum A. When the judge in the original divorce/custody action learned that Father had
filed a separate action for divorce under the newly adopted no-fault law, he entered the order
of February 8, 2013. Addendum A, E. In that order, the court rescinded and nullified all the
previously entered custody orders in the case and dismissed, with finality, the divorce action.
Addendum E. Accordingly, after February 8, 2013, there were no existing court orders
regarding custody and visitation in Mexico and there was no underlying actions relating to
custody or visitation. Certainly at the time the petition was filed in this case, November 18,
2013, no action relating to custody existed in Mexico and all prior orders from the dismissed
original divorce/custody case had been rescinded.
Although Father made references to the original divorce/custody action as somehow
being a "simultaneous proceeding" under the UUCCJEA, no party has represented or
contended that the original divorce/custody action was not dismissed. No party has asserted
that there is any procedure to revive the divorce action or that the rescinded orders could be
renewed and reissued.

The best evidence relating to the dismissal of the original

divorce/custody case in Mexico and the withdrawal of the prior orders is that Father has been
unable to initiate any action in that case or initiate any proceeding to enforce any prior order
since its dismissal on February 8, 2013. As discussed below, Father had to resort to filing
a new action in Mexico after the petition in this case was filed. Father would not have filed
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a new action if the prior divorce action could be revived and prior orders reissued. Further
confinnation is found in the fact that Father failed to even attempt to file in Utah any order
issued in the original divorce/custody case in Mexico under the Foreign Judgment Registry
Act, Utah Code § 78B-13-305( I )(b ).
2.

No Fault Proceeding in Mexico.

As discussed above, while the original divorce/custody case in Mexico was on appeal,
Father, trying to take advantage of newly enacted no-fault provisions, filed a separate action
for divorce in another court in Mexico and sought to obtain only a decree of divorce. On
November 25, 20 I 0, the court signed a decree of divorce under the no-fault law and
explicitly refused to deal with other issues in the divorce including custody of the children.
Statement of Facts, supra, iii! 4-6, 10-16; Addendum A, pp. 4-6; Addendum F; Rec. 1-7.
This action was filed only to get a no-fault divorce. No other issues relating to the
divorce, including custody, were included because both parties knew that all such issues were
litigated and, in fact, on appeal in the original divorce/custody case. Father did not assert or
demonstrate that he can legally open the no-fault case or expand the issues originally
addressed therein. Instead, Father instituted a new action in Mexico after the petition in this
case was filed.
3.

Newly Filed Case in Mexico

There can be no serious question that the original divorce/custody case in Mexico was
dismissed and all orders entered therein rescinded and nullified by the February 8, 2013
order. Fm1her, the plain language of the no-fault decree establishes that it is a final order that

29

attempted only to dissolve the marriage of the parties and did not attempt to resolve the other
issues, including custody, pending in the original divorce/custody case. There is no evidence
or legal citations that either the original divorce/custody case or the no-fault case could be
revived to provide a forum to litigate custody in Mexico and somehow construed to maintain
the original date of filing.
Mother therefore submits that there is simply no credible evidence of any kind that
there was an existing proceeding or order relating to the custody of the parties' minor
children on November 18, 2013, when the petition in this case was filed.
Father implicitly acknowledged the absence of any existing custody proceeding or
enforceable order in Mexico at the time the petition was filed, when he filed a new action in
Mexico on March 27, 2014 (128 days after the filing of the petition). Statement of Facts,

supra,

ii

15. Father would not have filed a new action post-petition if he could have

resurrected either the original divorce or the no-fault ancillary proceeding.

B.

The Lower Court Failed to Undertake the Investigation and Fact
Finding Required by Statute as to the Existence of Simultaneous
Proceedings in Another Jurisdiction.

The UUCCJEA provides the procedure to be used by the court in determining if, at
the time an action is filed, there was a simultaneous custody proceeding in another
jurisdiction, and, if so, how to resolve the matter. Utah Code§ 788-13-206( I) provides that
"a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if at the time of the
commencement of the proceeding a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been
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previously commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in
conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has been tenninated .... "
The statute accordingly requires the court, before hearing a child custody proceeding,
to examine the court documents and other infonnation supplied by the parties pursuant
relating to other custody proceedings. Utah Code § 788-13-206(2). If that review reveals
that a "child custody proceeding was previously commenced in a court in another state
having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this chapter,

... the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with
the court of the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction
substantially in accordance with this chapter does not determine that the court
of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss
the proceeding. (Emphasis added)
A communication between the lower court in this case and the courts in Mexico could
have been used to obtain other infonnation relating to the cases in Mexico,judicial procedure
in Mexico or to address any related concerns of either court. The process of communication
could have been used to conduct evidentiary hearings, hold hearings, etc. Utah Code§§ 78813-110, 111 and 112 (2008).

In this case, the court committed error in not staying the

proceeding, carefully reviewing the materials supplied by the parties and then communicating
with the court in Mexico that Father contended had jurisdiction in the matter.
The failure of the trial court to evaluate the material supplied by the parties as to the
existence of other custody proceedings or enforceable orders and then communicate with the
Mexico court was a breach and violation of the statutory mandate given to courts under the
UUCCJEA. The Utah appellate courts have held that "[a] failure to exercise discretion is
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generally encompassed within the meaning of abuse of discretion." State v. Montiel, 2005
UT 48,

ii 9,

122 P.3d 571, 575. "A district court's mistake oflaw may constitute an abuse

of its discretion." Snow, Christensen & Marteneau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ii 17, 299 P .3d
1058, 1064 (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). If this Court does not
hold, as Mother advocates, that the evidence submitted to the court clearly dispels any notion
that there were prior enforceable custody order or simultaneous proceedings at the time the
petition was filed, the matter should be remanded with directions that the trial court
communicate with the Mexico court in accordance with the statute.
C.

Summa,y.

Mother respectfully submits that the documents and infonnation supplied by the
parties establish the original divorce/custody case in Mexico was dismissed by order dated
Febmary 8, 2013 (nine months before the petition in this case was filed) and all orders in that
case rescinded by the same order. Further, that the no-fault divorce decree entered in Mexico
only dissolved the marriage of the parties and did not attempt to adjudicate custody and did
not reserve any right for the parties to continue litigating in that case. Finally, Mother
submits that the best evidence of the validity of her arguments is that in the nearly 2 ½ years
since the dismissal of the original divorce/custody case in Mexico, Father has not been able
to reactivate the original divorce/custody case, the no-fault case, or have any orders therein
reissued. Lastly, Father certainly would not have filed an entirely new action in Mexico after
the petition in this case was filed, if he had any chance of reviving the previously filed
actions in Mexico.
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III:

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY WEIGHED THE
EVIDENCE AND FAILED TO ACCEPT THE ALLEGATIONS
IN THE VERIFIED PETITION AS TRUE.

The orders entered by the lower court in this case holding that Utah does not have
subject matter jurisdiction do not disclose the method by which the court reached that
conclusion.

The factual findings, included in the lower court's orders, are legally

insufficient. Utah appellate courts have emphasized that a "trial court abuses its discretion
when it fails to enter specific, detailed findings. Findings are adequate only if they are
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Hall v. Hall, 858 P .2d 1018, I 021
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
This appeal follows the lower court's act in granting Father's motion to dismiss based
upon the alleged absence of subject matter jurisdiction. Addendum B, C and D. A motion to
dismiss based upon the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is controlled by Rule l 2(b )( 1)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Utah appellate courts have been clear that in adjudicating a motion to dismiss
based upon the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court is to accept the factual allegations
in the petition as true and to make all reasonable inferences therefrom. Oakwood Vil/. LLC
v. Albertson, Inc., 2004 UT 101, PP 8-9, 104 P.3d 1226; Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, 2002
UT App 56, 42 P.3d 1253; Atiya v. Salt Lake Coun(v, 852 P.2d I 007 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);

Hurst v. Highway Dep 't, 16 Utah 2d 153, 397 P.2d 71, 72 (1964); Giro/a v. Roussille, 81
Nev. 661,408 P.2d 918, 919 (1965) (motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is only
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appropriate when lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter appears on the face of the
pleading). Importantly, uncertainty as to the facts relevant to assessing the court's subject
matter jurisdiction will make it inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(l). Mallo,y v. Brigham Young Univ., 2012 UT App 242,285 P.3d 1230; rev. on other

grounds, Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27,332 P.3d 922.
Mother's verified petition alleged all the specific facts required by the UUCCJEA to
establish subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically the petition alleged the facts necessary to
establish that Utah was the home state of the children at the time of the filing of the petition;
that the prior original divorce/custody action in Mexico had been dismissed and orders issued
therein rescinded; and that the no-fault proceeding did not undertake any action to dispose
of custody related issues. Rec. 1, 8, 11, 17 and 53. Accordingly, the court should have denied
the motion to dismiss based upon the presumptions afforded the verified petition and the
failure to do so constitutes reversible error.
A.

The Court's Weighing of the Evidence or Consideration of Evidence
Outside the Pleadings Constituted Error.

The only reasonable explanation as to how the lower court could arrive at factual
findings that contravene the specific allegations in the verified petition and admitted by
Father's pleadings, is that the court conducted some kind of prohibited undisclosed fact
finding process and weighing of evidence that resulted in the findings made by the court.
Rule 12(b)( 6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure al lows a party to file a motion to
dismiss for "failing to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted." The rule
then provides that if "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
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court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided
in Rule 56 .... " Although Rule I 2(b )(1 ), which is the basis of Father's motion in this case,
does not provide a similar provision for the conversion to summary judgment when outside
material are relied upon by the court in its decision, this court has consistently prohibited the
weighing of evidence in adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule l 2(b )( 1).
Importantly, this Court has noted that the purpose of the Rule l 2(b )( 6) conversion
provision is "to allow parties an adequate opportunity to rebut materials outside the
pleadings." Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 Ut 82, 987 P.2d 36; see also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah

Farm Prod. Cred Ass 'n, 587 P.2d 151 (Utah 1978). Thus, while noting that the offering of
affirmative evidence does not automatically convert a Rule 12(b )(1) motion in to one for
summary judgment, "uncertainty as to the facts relevant to assessing the court's subject
matter jurisdiction will make it inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b )( 1) .

. . ." Mall01~v v. Brigham Young Univ., 2012 UT App 242, 285 P.3d 1230; rev. on other
grounds, Mal/01y v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27, 332 P.3d 922.
In Spoons, supra, while the Utah Supreme Court rejected Spoon's argument that the
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b )(1) had been converted to a summary judgment by the
court's acceptance of documents outside the pleadings, it reversed the dismissal of Spoon's
complaint for failure to file the required Governmental Immunity Act claim. See Spoons,
1999 UT 82,

ii

7, 987 P.2d 36. The Supreme Court explained that the complaint alleged

generally that the judge had engaged in a conspiracy but did not include enough factual detail
to determine the context in which the judge allegedly did so. Id. The Court concluded that
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the dismissal was premature because, if the plaintiff could "maintain any viable claims that
[the judge] engaged in a conspiracy occmTing outside the perfonnance of her duties, not
within the scope of her employment, and not under color of authority, the [UGIA 's] notice
of claim provisions would not apply [and the district court would have jurisdiction to
entertain the suit]." Id.
The reasoning of the Court is consistent with the general prohibition against a court
weighing evidence when considering motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. The law
is clear that the trial court cannot weigh contradictory evidence or determine credibility when
deciding whether dismissal or summary judgment is appropriate. See IHC Health Servs., Inc.

v. D & K Mgmt., 2008 UT 73,

iJ

18, 196 P.3d 588; Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County,

2002 UT 17; Anda/ex Res., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct.App.1994).
B.

The Findings and Conclusions Improperly Weigh the Evidence.

The relevant findings and conclusions in the court's orders are set out in the Statement
of Facts. Statement of Facts, supra, iii! 32 and 33. A review of the contents of the Order of
Dismissal dated 12/5/2014 illustrates Mother's position. In paragraphs 9 and 10 of that order
(Addendum B), the court finds the court in Mexico, hearing the original divorce/custody
case, confirmed its jurisdiction over child custody proceedings and reserved the parties rights
as subject to further litigation. id. The problem with the finding is that it reflected the status
of the case in November 2010. The findings and conclusions do not explain how that
jurisdiction survived the order of February 8, 2013, where the judge in the original
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divorce/custody case dismissed the entire case and rescinded all orders previously entered
by that com1. Id., Rec. 1-7, Addendum E.
Paragraph IO of the court's findings states that "no Mexico court has vacated the
order" is contradicted by the order of February 8, 2013, supplied to the court by both parties.
There is no finding or evidence that, as of the November 18, 2013, filing of the petition in
this case, there was any standing order relating to custody in Mexico or any ongoing
proceedings relating to custody in progress.
In paragraph 12, the court finds that Mexico has jurisdiction over both parties and
home-state jurisdiction over the children. Further, the paragraph recites that the jurisdiction
was continuing. Id. The paragraph fails to recognized that as of the date the petition was
filed, Mexico did not have jurisdiction over Mother and that it no longer had "home-state"
jurisdiction over the children. Further, the paragraph fails to mention the undisputed fact that
the court in Mexico asserting jurisdiction had, on its own initiative, dismissed the action and
rescinded all orders on February 8, 2013, nine months before the petition was filed in this
case.
Paragraph 16 concludes that Mother has to modify the parties' custodial rights as
articulated in Mexico and that Mexico has continuing jurisdiction over custody proceedings.

Id. The paragraph is silent as to how Mother is to modify an order that was rescinded by the
issuing court in Mexico and resurrect a proceeding in Mexico that the court, on its own
initiative, dismissed.
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Even if findings were permitted on a motion to dismiss, therefore, the findings and
conclusions of the court are simply contrary to the undisputable evidence in the case. Utah
was the home state of the children at the time the petition was filed. At the time of filing,
Mexico had no existing child custody orders in place and no proceedings existed where child
custody was an issue. As argued above, if Father had an enforceable custody order in Mexico
or had access to an on-going proceeding, he certainly would have proceeded in one of the
existing Mexico actions to obtain enforcement orders rather than filing, after Mother's
petition was filed, a new action in Mexico. Mother submits that all the findings and
conclusions of the court relating to jurisdiction must be rejected and reversed.
IV:

THE CRIMINAL ACTION FILED IN MEXICO IS NOT A
"SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDING" REQUIRING UT AH
COURTS TO DEFER JURISDICTION.

Contrary to the lower court's findings, the criminal case m Mexico is not a
"simultaneous proceedings" under the UUCCJEA that can be used as a basis for Utah to
defer jurisdiction because Mexico, in the criminal case, did not "have[] jurisdiction
substantially in confonnity with the [jurisdictional requirements of the UUCCJEA]." Utah
Code§ 78B-13-206 (2008). Statement of Facts, supra, iii! 32-33.
By way of background, Father, in his original motion to dismiss, relied on the original
divorce/custody action in Mexico and the separate no-fault proceeding to base his claim that
jurisdiction under the UUCCJEA resided in Mexico. When Mother demonstrated, in her
response, that at the time the petition was filed, the original divorce/custody action in Mexico
had been dismissed and all orders vacated, Father evolved another strategy. That strategy
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was based on the notion that Mexico had commenced a criminal proceeding against Mother
for taking the children out of Mexico and that proceeding, according to Father, constituted
a "simultaneous proceeding" under the UUCCJEA and required Utah to defer jurisdiction.
That argument was incorporated in the contents of the Order of Dismissal dated 12/5/2014,
paragraphs 18 and 19. Addendum B, Statement of Facts, supra, ilil 32 and 33.
The facts relevant to understanding the criminal action can be summarized as follows.
On June 30, 2010, the Mexican court in the original divorce/custody case issued an order
granting Mother "custodia definitivia" over the minor children. Addendum A, pp. 4-6.
Mother, who was represented by counsel, believed it was an order tantamount to a sole
custody award and that she was now free to leave Mexico if she so desired. In August 2010,
each of the parties appealed the June 30, 2010 order. On November 25, 2010, the court in
which the separate no-fault case had been filed entered a no-fault divorce decree. Id.
In December 2010, Mother left Mexico with the minor children and went directly to
Orem, Utah, where the Mother, maternal grandmother and the two children have resided ever
since. The children have, by all accounts thrived. The children are excellent students,
engaged in a wide array of extracurricular programs. The children are well entrenched in
their lives and in the community that surrounds them. Id. Rec. 458-70, 481-90, 492.
Father filed a written criminal complaint with the prosecutor prompting the charges
against Mother. Rec. 147. Mother is accused of removing the minor children from Mexico
in December 20 IO with the intent of changing the children's customary domicile. Rec. 140,
144-45. The relevant provision is grouped under the "child trafficking" section of Mexico's
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Federal Criminal Code. Id. Mother has, at all times, fully cooperated in the matter and is
represented by counsel in those proceedings. Mother and the children with the maternal
grandmother continue to reside in their home in Orem, Utah. Rec. 458-470, 481-90.
The criminal prosecution of Mother cannot be characterized as a "simultaneous
proceeding" under the UUCCJEA and used as a basis for Utah to defer jurisdiction. Utah
Code § 788-13-206 (2008) established the required elements of a simultaneous proceeding:
( 1)
Except as otherwise provided in Section 788-13-204 [temporary
emergency jurisdiction], a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction
under this chapter if at the time of the commencement of the proceeding a
proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been previously
commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially
in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has been terminated
or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more
convenient forum under Section 78B-13-207. (Emphasis added)
These elements are not satisfied here. When the criminal case was commenced on
September 27, 2012, Mexico did not have home state jurisdiction. Rec. 144. Nor was
Mexico the home state of the children six months before filing. See Utah Code§ 78B-13-201
(2008). The children have been out of Mexico since December 2010. The criminal court has
no jurisdiction over Father or the minor children. Importantly, the criminal court has no
jurisdiction generally to issue child custody orders. All a criminal com1 could do is affect
the actions of Mother as it relates to the children in some degree.
The decision in Meyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT App 364, 196 P.3d 604, could not be
clearer and the ruling more apposite to this case. This Com1 mandated that the Utah court
must make the decision of whether another state's court has jurisdiction. Id. ii 6, citing Utah
Code § 78B-13-206(2). A claim by a court of another state of jurisdiction is not binding on
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the Utah court determination. Id. This Court then cited cases where the challenging state did
not have home state jurisdiction and therefore did not acquire jurisdiction in accordance with
the UUCCJEA. Id. See We/ch-Doden v. Roberts, 202 Ariz. 20 I, 42 P .3d I I 66, I I 76 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2002); Arjona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006; In re Burk,
252 S. W.3d 736, 741 (Tex. App. 2008); Hatch v. Hatch (In re Ka/bes), 2007 WI App 136,
733 N. W.2d 648 ("[T]he Idaho court did not have jurisdiction to make an initial
determination of [the child's] custody because [the child's] 'home state' was Wisconsin. The
Idaho court therefore did not have jurisdiction 'substantially in conformity with [the
UCCJEA],' and the Wisconsin court was not prohibited from exercising jurisdiction under
[the simultaneous proceeding statute]." ( footnote omitted)).
The court in NB v. GA, 133 Haw. 436,329 P.3d 341 (Haw. Ct. App. 2014) noted that
the comment to section 206 of the Uniform Act provides that "[ u ]nder this Act, the
simultaneous proceedings problem will arise only when there is no home State, no State with
exclusive, continuingjurisdiction and more than one significant connection State." Uniform
Act § 206 cmt. ( I 997).
When the criminal case was filed, September 27, 2013, Utah had been the home state
of the children for nearly three years. Further the original divorce/custody case in Mexico
was dismissed and all orders rescinded on February 8, 2013, more than seven moths prior to
the filing. The criminal court did not have jurisdiction over Father or the children and did
not have authority to enter a custody order. The court in Mexico did not acquire jurisdiction
in accordance with the UUCCJ EA and therefore cannot be a simultaneous proceeding. The
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conclusion that the Mexico criminal case was a Hsimultaneous [custody] proceeding" should
~

bereve~ed.
V:

MOTHER DID NOT ENGAGE IN UNJUSTIFIABLE CONDUCT
THUS ALLOWING UTAH TO DECLINE JURISDICTION.

The court made a finding that Mother had engaged in unjustifiable conduct and that

~

the misconduct justified Utah to decline jurisdiction. Findings of Fact, ilil 32-33. The
underlying statute is Utah Code § 788-13-208 (2008). In relevant part, the statute states:
Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct. (I) Except as otherwise provided
in Section 788-13-204 or by other law of this state, if a court of this state has
jurisdiction under this chapter because a person invoking the jurisdiction has
engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its
jurisdiction unless: (a) the parents and all persons acting as parents have
acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction; (b) a court of the state otherwise
having jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201 through 788-13-203
determines that this state is a more appropriate forum under Section 788-13207; or (c) no other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201
through 788-13-203.
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to
Subsection (I), it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of
the child and prevent a repetition of the wrongful conduct, including staying
the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court
having jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201 through 78B-13-203.

Id.
Mother alleged in her verified Petition the facts and circumstances that existed that
prompted her to move the children to Utah. Rec. 1, ilil 11, 12, 458-470, 481-90. The court
conducted no hearing relating to the matter and accordingly, pursuant to the cases discussing
Rule l 2(b )(1) discussed above, the allegations in the Petition are sufficient to survive a
e,,.:;\

motion to dismiss. Fm1her, Judge Kimball found that there was significant discord in the
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w

marriage for many years (See Addendum A, p. 4). While Judge Kimball did not make
express findings relating to the verbal and emotional abuse that Father did or did not inflict
on Mother, he analyzed the facts and made findings as to the abuse that Father was
responsible for in relation to the minor children. Id. at pp. 8-9.

As it related to the

relationship between Mother and Father, Judge Kimball simply noted the contents of the
psychological reports and then stated, that "[ e ]ven if some of the al legations are true [of
abuse relating to Mother], they have not been proven by clear and convincing evidence ...
. Id. at 9.
Based upon the allegations in the Petition of physical, verbal and emotional abuse and
the lack of any explicit findings by Judge Kimball that the spousal abuse did not occur, there
is no basis under the statute to decline jurisdiction.
Additionally, even if there was serious misconduct on the part of the Petitioner, the
exceptions contained in the statute would apply. As set out above, serious misconduct could
be a basis to decline jurisdiction "unless: ... (c) no other state would have jurisdiction under
Sections 788-13-20 I through 78B-13-203." Id. As argued above, there is no basis in the
UCCJEA for a finding that Mexico has jurisdiction in this matter. There was no prior
custody order that remained in effect that could be modified. There was no proceeding in
place when the Petition was filed. Crucially, Mexico is no longer the home state of the
children and has not held that designation since 20 I 0, four years ago.

43

The trial court's finding that Mother engaged in unjustifiable conduct was improper
on a motion to dismiss, and was contrary to the undisputable evidence. The judgment of the
trial court should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The order of the court dismissing this case based upon a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent
with the UUCCJEA.
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Opinion
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

Libbey-Aguilera"). who is the mother of the children,
requested that the court continue the hearing to allow her to
obtain counsel and to respond to the Petition. The court then
rescheduled the hearing for June 28, 2013, and the hearing
took place on that date. At the hearing, Petitioner [*2] was
represented hy David S. Dolowitz and James M. Hunnicutt.
Respondent was represented hy Clayton A. Simms and Staci
Visser.
Prior to June 28. 2013 hearing. the court carefully reviewed
the Petition. the Response to the Petition (the "Response
Brief"''), and all affidavits and exhibits that had been
provided to the court. At the June 28, 2013 hearing,
Petitioner requested an opportunity to reply to Ms.
Libbcy-Aguilera's Response, which had been filed the
evening hcforc the hearing. Petitioner's reply (the "Reply
Brief"'') was filed on July I 9. 2013. 1 The court has now
carefully reviewed the Reply Brief. along with all exhibits
accompanying the brief. 2 Now. having carefully considered
all of the evidence submitted. along with the relevant
authorities on the legal issues presented, the court renders
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order.

I. BACKGROUND

A.
This matter is before the court on Juan Pahlo Matas- Vidal's
("Petitioner" or "Mr. Matas-Vidal") Petition for Immediate
Return of Children to Petitioner Pursuant to the Hague
Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act ("ICARA"). The court initially set a hearing on the
Petition for June I8. 2013. At that hearing. however.
Respondent Susan Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera. also knmvn
as
Brooke
Robinson
("Respondent"
or
"Ms.

GE~l-:R,\L FACTL,\L BACKGIWL~I)

Petitioner claims that his ex-wi l'c wrongfully removed the
parties' two minor children. SM-L and RM-L, from their
habitual residence in Mexico City. Mexico, in December
20 IO or January 2011. He contends that Respondent wilfully
disobeyed the orders of the Mexican Court. which had given
him custody rights and had prohihitcd Ms. Libbey-Aguilera
from removing the couple's children from their hahitual

1

The court initially set a deadline of July 12. 20 I 3. hut the parties stipulated to a one-week extension. until July 19. 2013. and the court
permilled the extension.
2

The court has also considered Respondent's Corrections LO Respondent's Exhibits (Docket No. 33). Petitioner·s Response to the
Coi,-ections ( Docket No. 34 ). and a lener P 3) from the social worker who has recl·ntly met with the children. See Sealed Docket No.
35.
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residence in Mexico. Petitioner further argues that
Respondent's allegations of domestic violence arc untrue
and were fabricated long after the divorce proceedings to
alienate the children from him. He contends that Respondent.
after removing the children to the United States. hid the
children from him hy having her name changed through a
court proceeding in the state of Idaho and hy changing the
names of their minor children in their school records.
Petitioner asks this court to return the children to Mexico
City so that the custody issues may be resolved there.
Respondent, however. contends that the Mexican court had
awarded her sole custody and had dissolved the [*4] orders
preventing her from leaving Mexico. Therefore, she argues,
she did not wrongfully remove the children from Mexico.
She also claims that she and the children were victims of
domestic violence at the hands of Petitioner, which is why
she fled Mexico. She has asserted several reasons why the
children should not he sent back to Mexico.

B.

LEGAL BACKGROL:~I)

This action has heen brought pursuant to the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (the "Hague Convention" or the "Convention"),
which has been implemented in the United States by the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (''I CARA"). 42
U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610. The Hague Convention was adopted
to protect children from the adverse effects of being
wrongfully removed to or retained in a foreign country and
to establish procedures for their return. See Ohlander v.
Larson, 114 F.3d 1531. 1534 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction. Dec. 23, 198 L Prcamhle. 51 Fed. Reg.
10494. 10.498 ( 1986)). "The Convention is meant to provide
for a child's prompt return once it has been established the
child has been 'wrongfully removed' to or retained in
1*51 any affiliated state." Id. (quoting Convention. art. 1).
The court's role is not to make traditional custody decisions
hut to determine in what jurisdiction the children should be
physically located so that the proper jurisdiction can make
those custody decisions. Loos \'. Manuel. 278 N.J. Super.

607, 651 A.2d I 077 (N .J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994 ); see also
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060. I063 (6th Cir. 1996).

II. HISTORY OF CASE
Petitioner filed the instant action on June 7, 2013. At the
same time, he filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order, Order to Show Cause, Writ of Assistance, and
Request for Immediate Return of Minor Children (the
"Motion for a TRO"). On June 7, 2013, the court granted the
Motion for a TRO and entered an Order (the "June 7, 2013
Order"), which, among other things, prohibited Ms.
Libbey-Aguilera from interfering with the children being
taken into protective custody. 3 The June 7, 2013 Order also
stated that the court would hold an immediate hearing after
the Order was served to determine whether the court should
order the return of the children to Petitioner to allow him to
immediately return with them to Mexico. 4
On June 14. 2013, the United States [*6] of America filed
an Emergency Motion to Intervene, Request for Stay of
Temporary Restraining Order and Hearing. 5 The reason for
United States' motion was that the United States believed
there was a conflict between this court's June 7, 2013 Order
and a previous Order entered by a Magistrate Judge of this
court in a criminal Extradition proceeding involving
Respondent. 6 In the motion, the United States explained
that the Government of Mexico had asked the United States.
through diplomatic channels, for the provisional arrest of
Ms. Libbey-Aguilera for the purpose of extradition for her
alleged perpetration of Child Trafficking under Mexican
law. Pursuant to an arrest warrant signed by a Magistrate
Judge on May 9, 2013, Ms. Libbey-Aguilera had been
arrested, and an initial appearance had been held on May I0,
2013. The Magistrate Judge ordered. among other things,
that (I) Ms. Libbey-Aguilera wear a GPS ankle monitor.
report to pretrial services daily. and maintain her current
residence; and (2) the two minor children were to remain
with Ms. Libbey-Aguilera at her residence; 7 and (3) the
passports of Ms. Libbey-Aguilera and her children be turned
over to pretrial services; and that
1*7] (4) Ms.
Libbey-Aguilera and the minor children were not to leave
the state without the permission of the Court. 8 Accordingly.

~

See Docket No. 5

_.

Id.

~

Docket No. 6.

''

The Extradition proceeding is Case No. 2: I 3M.I 151. A probable cause hearing has been set for August 12. 2013.

7

The United States maintained that this court's June 7. 2013 Order directing the minor children to he taken into protective custody
was in conllict with the i\'lagistrate Judge·s Order for the children to rc.:main with Ms. Aguilera.

s

See Case No. 2: 13:'vlJ 151. Docket No. 6. Order Selling Conditions of Release al 2.

Page 3 of 14
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110630. *7
the United States asked this court for permission to intervene
in the instant case and also to stay the proceedings,
including the court's Order dated June 7. 2013 until such
time as the court could hold a hearing to address the
apparent conflict in the two Orders. On June 17. 20 I 3. the
court set a hearing for June 18, 2013.
The apparent conflict in the two court Orders had prevented
the Orem Police Department from contacting the Department
of Child and Family Services ("DCSF"). Todd Gabler. a
private investigator in the State of Utah Department of
Public Safety, who was working with Petitioner, informed
the court, through an affidavit [*8] filed on June I 8. 2013,
that. on June 13. 2013. he had served a copy of this Court's
June 7, 2013 Order on the Orem Police Department. 9 At
that time, he had asked the officers to contact him when the
Order was to be served on Ms. Libbey-Aguilera. He also
served a copy of the Order on Ms. Libbey-Aguilera on June
16. 2013. He stated in his Affidavit that, moments after
serving Ms. Libbey-Aguilera with the Order, the Orem
Police Department responded to Ms. Libbey-Aguilcra's
residence, and he gave the officers another copy of the
Order. According to Mr. Gabler, the officers refused to
contact DCFS to pick up the children. as directed by the
June 7 Order, because Ms. Libbey-Aguilera had produced
the Magistrate Judge's Order, which she claimed required
her to keep the children with her at her place of residence.
10

During the June I 8, 20 I 3 hearing, the court permiued the
United States to intervene for the purpose of pointing out
the apparent conflict between this court's June 7 Order and
the Magistrate Judge's Order Setting Conditions of Release
in the Extradition proceeding. At the June 18. 2013 hearing.
Ms. Libbey-Aguilera was not represented by counsel, hut

On June 21. 2013, Mr. Simms requested that, due to the
time-sensitive nature of this proceeding and his familiarity
with the facts and circumstances of this case. he be
appointed as Ms. Libbey-Aguilera's counsel in the instant
matter because it is ancillary to his CJA appointment in the
Extradition matter. 11 The court granted the request. 12
On June 24. 2011, Ms. Libbey-Aguilera filed a Motion to
Appoint Guardian ad Litem ("GAL") for the two children
involved in this mauer. u Mr. Matas-Vidal opposed the
motion on June 25, 20 I 3, and Ms. Libbey-Aguilera filed a
Reply on June 26, 2013. 1•1 The court issued an Order on
June 26, 2013. deferring 1*10) ruling on the motion until
after the June 28. 2013 hearing. 15 In the Order, the court
explained that it intended to proceed with the scheduled
June 28 hearing and that if it became apparent at the hearing
that a GAL would be helpful to the court's determination,
the court would appoint one and hold a subsequent hearing.
I(,

At the June 28. 2013 hearing. the court heard argument from
counsel on the merits of the Petition. 17 At the hearing. the
court also inquired about permitting Petitioner to sec his

See Docket No. 8.

"
IO

Id.

11

Docket No. 13.

1

='

Docket No. 14.

'

Docket No. 15.

1

counsel [*9) who had been appointed pursuant to the
Criminal Justice Act ("CJA") to represent her in her
criminal Extradition proceeding, Clayton Simms, appeared
as a friend of the court. He explained that Ms.
Libbey-Aguilera had just been served with the actual
Petition on that day and that she had not had an opportunity
to find counsel to represent her. Mr. Simms requested that
the court continue the hearing to allow Ms. Libbey-Aguilera
time to find counsel. The court granted the request and
continued the hearing until June 28, 20 I 3.

11
•

Docket Nos. 18. 19. respectively.

1

Docket No. 21.

~

11

'
Ultimately. the court did not find that the appointment of a GAL would he helpful to the court's resolution of this matter and has
therefore never ordered thal a GAL be appointed.
17

At the hearing. Petitioner's counsel indicated that hecause Rcsponden1·s Response Brief and exhihils had heen filed late on June 27.
2013. he had not had time to thoroughly revie\v everything or to respond to :vis. Lihhcy-Aguilcra·s arguments. He asked for an
opportunity lo file a reply to her response. and the court set a deadli11L' of July 12. 2013 for the Reply Brief. which deadline was later
exlcnded. with permission of lhc court. to July 19. 2013.
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children. 18 After some discussion among the parties, they
agreed to arrange a time and place for a supervised visit
within the next few days. while Mr. Matas-Vidal was still in
the United States. Subsequently. because of the children's
reluctance about seeing their father, the parties decided that
the children should meet with a reunification therapist prior
to their first meeting. 19 As of the date of this Order, it
appears that the children f*ll] have met at least twice with
a therapist but have not yet visited with their father. 20 At the
June 28 hearing, the court also conducted an in camera
interview of each of the minor children, without any
attorneys present.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT

Petitioner 1*121 and Respondent were married in Mexico
City on June 26. 1999. Petitioner is a Mexican national, and
Respondent has dual citizenship in Mexico and the United
States. as her father was a United States citizen and her
mother was a Mexican citizen. SM-L was born in Mexico
City in May 200 I, and RM-L was born in Mexico City in
November 2003. At some point when the children were very
young, the couple discussed the possibility of moving to the
United States. but that possibility never came to fruition
because Petitioner could not find adequate-paying work in
the United States. The children were granted United States
citizenship in 2005. In October 2006. Ms. Libbey-Aguilera
purchased a condominium in San Antonio, Texas and
sometimes visited there. For the duration of their marriage,
however, Petitioner. Respondent, and their two children
always lived in Mexico City. They lived there until the time
Ms. Libbey-Aguilera removed the children from Mexico to
Utah in December 20 I0.
There appears to have been significant discord in the
marriage for many years. When Petitioner expressed his
desire for a divorce in September 2007. Respondent took a
1

x

Petitioner had sought to sec his children

al

trip to Texas, taking the two children with her without
[*13] seeking permission from their father. The
circumstances of her return several days later are disputed
but immaterial to the resolution of this matter. In any event.
after her return to Mexico. Petitioner filed for divorce in
early October 2007 in Mexico City.
On October 16, 2007, the Mexican court issued an Order
barring the removal of the children from Mexico. Petitioner
had sought such an Order because of the previous incident
when Respondent had taken the children to Texas without
his permission. On December 14. 2007. after a mediation on
December 11, 2007. the court ordered that Ms.
Libbey-Aguilera would be granted the provisional physical
custody of the children at their marital domicile. Petitioner
would have visits on Saturdays and Sundays every other
week from l 0:00 a.m. - l :00 p.m. at the Supervised
Visitation and Socialization Center. It was also ordered that
Mr. Matas-Vidal may socialize with his children on holidays,
the children· s birthdays, and fifty percent of school vacations.
with prior notice and mutual agreement of both parties. 21
The December 14, 2007 Order again prohibited Respondent
from taking the children out of Mexico. 22
On June 30, 2010, the Mexican court issued an order
granting "custodia definitivcl' to Respondent (the "June 30.
20 IO Order"). 23 Respondent argues that the Order granted
her "sole custody" and dissolved any restrictions on her
travel outside of Mexico. Petitioner. however, has provided
evidence that the English translation of "custodia definitiva"
is not "sole custody," as that term is understood in the
United States, and he has also provided evidence that,
because he still had custody rights, Respondent was still
prohibited from leaving Mexico. 2•1 The June 30, 20 l O Order
provided that Mr. Matas-Vidal "has the obligation and
essential human right to visit and go out with his children .
. . on Saturdays and Sundays ... every other weekend.

the initial June 12 hearing. hut the court declined to order a visitation at that time.

19

The parties had reached this agreement while the court was still conducting its in camera interviews of the children. After the
interviews. the court praised this agreement hy the parties and confirmed to counsel that the children were scared to sec their father. See
Transcript. Docket No. 25 pp. 44-46.
='

0

=''

See Sealed Docket No. 35. Letter from Paul \\'. Dawson. MSW. LCSW.

These visits would not have been at 1*141 the Socialization Center. and it docs not appear that Respondent ever permitted these

visits.
;,;, See Docket No. 22-1. Respondent's Affidavit in Support to Objections to Petition for Immediate Return. p. 4: see also Docket No.
28-3. Ex. 5(h) Temporary Custody & Support Order. English Translation.
21
·

Docket No. 28. Ex. 14(h). The Order was published on July 12. 2010. Respondent initially claimed that the Order was entered on
July 12. 2009. hut there is no dispute now that the Order was published on July 12. 2010. following proceedings on June JO. 20 I0.
24

Docket No. >I. Ex. 2.
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Visitations shall begin on Saturdays at IO AM and end on
Sundays at 6 PM." 25 These visits were not ordered to take
place at the Supervised Visitation and [*151 Socialization
Center. Mr. Matas-Vidal was to "pick the children up at they
place where they live with their mother and return them to
the same place." 26
In August 2010, each parent appealed the June 30. 20 I0
Order. Mr. Matas- Vidal appealed the Order because. among
other things. he believed that Ms. Libbey-Aguilera was
obstructing his ability to visit with the children and he
thought further psychological testing would assist the court
in its determination. 27 During 20 I0. new psychological
examinations were in progress but were not filed with the
court until February 20 I I-after Respondent had fled
Mexico.
On November 25, 2010. a bifurcated decree of divorce was
entered. Thus. the divorce had become final, but the issue of
child custody [*161 and support were still being litigated.
During the custody litigation. Petitioner exercised all
visitation awarded to him by the Mexican court. He regularly
exercised his right of access until the children were removed
from Mexico. On January 8. 20 I I and January 9. 2011, he
went to the Supervised Family Interaction Center hut Ms.
Libbey-Aguilera and the boys did not show up. He then
confirmed that they no longer lived at their marital home
and was informed by the boys' school that, as of December
16, 20 I 0, the boys had stopped attending school.
In December 2010, Respondent surreptitiously removed the
children from Mexico to the United States. 28 She came
directly to Orem. Utah and enrolled the children in school
on December 21. 2010. They have been continuously
enrolled in the same school since January 20 I I. Teachers
and administrators have repeatedly noted their good behavior

and academic excellence. 29 The children are both on a
competitive swim team. SM-L was a cub scout and now
participates regularly as a boy scout. He also is on a soccer
team. RM-L is a cub scout. They were both baptized as
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
and attend meetings regularly. [*17) SM-L received the
Aaronic Priesthood when he turned twelve. They both spend
substantial time with their maternal grandmother. Respondent
began working for the Provo School District on March 7,
2011 and has remained gainfully employed with the district
since that time.
On January 7, 2011, after Respondent had removed the
children from Mexico, the Mexican appeals court revoked
the June 30, 2010 Order. On February 4, 2011, the second
set of psychological reports were issued. 30 While the
English translations of these reports are somewhat difficult
to analyze. it is clear that the psychological report on the
children found that they did not have emotional indications
that were consistent with a profile of a child that had
suffered violence. 31 In addition, while the boys both had a
negative view of their father, the psychologist noted their
perception was "without sustaining real or valid experiences"
1*181 and that their attitudes "are determined by induction
and manipulation which their mother has exercised upon
them." 32
The psychological report on Ms. Libbey-Aguilera found,
among other things, that she had a "tendency to lie,"
dysfunctional behavior patterns which may affect in a
negative manner the interaction within her family and social
environment," that she "tends to carry out manipulation
attitudes in particular with her children," and that she had
"aggressive or violent tendencies, especially of a verbal

:.>:'i

Docket No. 28. Ex. 14(h) at p. 14 (English Translation).

26

lti.

n

It is unclear why Ms. Lihhey-Aguilcra appealed. hut she has not disputed that she appealed the June 30. 20 IO Order.

:.>x
Respondent claims that she acted on the hclief that the final custody order no longer restricted her from lawfully taking the children
across the horder 10 the United States. Docket No. 22-1. Respondent's Aff. al p.6.
29

See Docket No. 22-1. Respondent's Aff. at pp.7-8 antl attached exhibits.

1

"
The findings in these second psychological reports do
No. 28. Ex. 11 (h).

11

1101

vary significamly from the initial reports. prepared in 2008. See Docket

See Docket No. 4-1. Ex. 21-h. p. 7.

l:.>
Docket No. 4-1. Ex. 21-h. pp.4-5. The psychologist noted that the dread the hoys feel ahout their father is "more consistent with
induction and manipulation altitudes to them than as a result of their own experiences." id. p. 7. and th.it it "is inferred that they have
been mostly induced or manipulated hy their mother." Id.
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nature. 33 The report also noted that Ms. Libbey-Aguilera
now reported taking the children to a private psychological
evaluation to confirm the use of violence and sexual
(*19] abuse, which was information Ms. Libbey-Aguilera
"did not express in her first evaluation." 34 The psychological
report on Mr. Matas-Vidal staled that there were no
indications of aggressive or violent tendencies. 35 The
psychologist found no reason why he should not live
together with his children. 36 Petitioner suggests that
Respondent fled before the reports were issued because she
suspected that they would not be favorable to her.
On February 9. 2011, in the District Court for the Seventh
Judicial District in the State of Idaho. Respondent had her
name legally changed to Brooke Robinson, claiming that
she needed to change her name because she was "divorcing
her husband and am seeking to avoid being located hy my
husband for the reason he has threatened to kill me and my
family." 37 Respondent and her two children had been Iivinoe
in Orem, Utah from December 20 IO through the present
time.
Petitioner [*20) had been looking for his children since he
realized they were gone in January 2011. He had started to
try to find Respondent in Texas, believing she was there
because she had previously purchased a condominium
there. Because she had changed her name to Brooke
Robinson in early 2011, and because she had changed the
boys' names in their school records in October 2011, 38 it
took Petitioner until earlier this year to discover where his
children were located. Law enforcement located Respondent
in Utah in May 2013. The instant Petition was filed on June
7, 2013. 39
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. APPLICAHILITY OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The court finds that the Convention applies to this dispute.
SM-L and RM-L are both under 16 years old; they were
.n

Docket No. 4. Ex. 20-h. pp. 210-212.

,.i

Id. p. 207.

y,

Docket No. 4. p. 183. 191.

,c,

Id. at p. 183.

habitual residents of Mexico; and both Mexico and the
United States arc contracting states. •ID See 42 U.S.C. §
I I 603(e)( I )(A); Hague Conv., art. 3.

B.

WHETHER THE RDIOVAL WAS WRONGFL"L

The first question the court must address is whether the
children were "wrongfully removed" [*21] from Mexico, or,
in other words, whether they were removed in violation of
a right of custody. Once a petitioner establishes that removal
was wrongful, the child must he returned unless an exception
is applicable. Abbott v. Abbott 560 U.S. I, 130 S. Ct. I 983,
1990. 176 L. Ed. 2d 789 (20 I0) (citing 42 U.S.C. § §
l l 603(a)); Blo11di11 \'. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 245 (2nd Cir.
1999); see also 42 U.S.C. § I 160I(a)(4) ("Children who are
wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the
Convention arc to be promptly returned unless one of the
narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention applies.").
Moreover, "I e Ivcn where the grounds for one of these
"narrow" exceptions have been established. the district court
is not necessarily bound to allow the child to remain with
the abducting parent." Blo11di11, 189 F.3d at 246 n.4 (quoting
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067) (6th Cir. 1996)
("I A] federal district court retains, and should usc when
appropriate, the discretion to return a child, despite the
existence of a defense, if return would further the aims of
the Convention.")).
Petitioner bears the burden of showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that the removal or retention was wrongful.
Accordingly, Petitioner [*22) must demonstrate that:
(A) the child was habitually resident in a given state at
the time of the removal or retention:
(B) the removal or retention was in breach of petitioner's
custody rights under the laws of that state; and
(C) petitioner was exercising those rights at the time of
removal or retention .

7

·'
Docket No. 30-7. Exhihit 7. As required by Idaho law. respondent represented in her name-change petition that she was a resident
of Idaho. hut Respondent admits now that she was never a resident of Idaho.
'

8

N

See Docket No. 28. Ex. 23.

Docket No. I .

The court finds unmeritorious Respondent's argument that the children's hahitual residence had shifted to the United States at the
time of removal.

.m
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Chafin v. Chafin. 133 S. Ct 1017. 1021. 185 L. Ed. 2d I
(2013) (quotill[? Hague Conv.. art. 3 ).

Here, the court finds that Petitioner has met his burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that SM-Land
RM-L were habitually resident in Mexico City at the time of
the removal. The children were born in Mexico City and
never lived anywhere other than Mexico until Respondent
removed them to the United States in December 2010.
The court also concludes that the removal was in breach of
Petitioner's custody rights under Mexican law and that
Petitioner was exercising those rights at the time of removal.
Although Respondent claims that she was awarded "sole
custody" and that any restraints on her ability to take the
children across the border were dissolved, the court does not
agree. The July 9. 20 IO Order states that Respondent was
given "custodia de.finith·a." but that is not the same thing as
"sole custody." [*23] as discussed below. 41 It is unclear
why Respondent believed that the Order gave her the right
to leave Mexico with the children when the June 30. 2010
Order provided that Mr. Matas-Vidal could visit and socialize
with his children on Saturdays and Sundays every two
weeks from Saturday at 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 6.00 p.m.
42

Moreover. hoth parties appealed that order in August 2010.
Under Mexican law. the challenged order had no effect, so
the ne exeat order from October 16. 2007 remained in
effect. .n In addition. even the bifurcated divorce decree,
issued on November 25. 20 I0, provides that: "both parties
stated that no settlement may he reached, since the legal
status of their minor children whose names are [SM-L and
RM-L] arc subject (*24) to litigation with the 36th Mexico
City Family Court." 4 --1 Because the June 30, 20 IO order was
being appealed. and because custody was still subject to

litigation, the interim ne exeat order from October 16, 2007
continued to apply. 45
Regardless of which Order applied, however, Petitioner had
intrinsic ne exeat rights barring the children's removal. If a
petitioner only has "rights of access'' rather than "rights of
custody," then the petitioner cannot seek return of the child
under the Convention. See, e.g., Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1989.
The issue of "custody" must be [*25] addressed under the
law of Mexico. See Pesin v. Osorio Rodriguez, 77 F. Supp.
2d 1277, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Ohlwuler v. Larson, I 14
F.3d 153 l, 1541 ( 10th Cir. 1997). Pursuant to Mexico's
Civil Code, both parents general1y have "rights of custody"
to their children at all times. See, e.g., Asuncion Mota v.
Rivera Castillo, 692 F.3d I 08 (2nd Cir. 2012): Whal/on \'.
Lynn, 230 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2000); Saldivar v. Rodela, 879
F. Supp. 2d 610 (W.D. Tex. 2012). In these cases, the U.S.
court accepted affidavits from Mexican lawyers describing
rights of custody in Mexico.
In this case, Petitioner has provided a declaration by
Petitioner's Mexican counsel, in which he provides an
explanation of patria potestas, which means "parental
authority" in Spanish, and is somewhat akin to the American
notion of "legal custody," or decision-making authority for
a minor child. In Spanish, "custodia" refers to what we in
the United States would call "physical custody." which
addresses which parent a child lives with. While a Mexican
court may grant custody to one parent, that does not negate
the other parent's rights of parental authority. 46
In Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 176 L. Ed.
2d 789 (2010), [*26) the United States Supreme Court
concluded that a ne exeat right is a right of custody under
the Convention. See id. at 1990-91. A ne exeat right consists
of the authority to consent before the other parent may take
the child to another country. See id. at 1987.
Having considered the various cases cited by the parties, the
court concludes that Petitioner's patria potestas rights are

41

The July 9. 2010 Order was ullimatcly revoked on January IO. 2011. See Docket No. 30. Ex. 5 (the Order is mistakenly identified
as being published on January I 0. 20 I 0. but there is no dispute that it was published on January I 0. 20 I I). Because Respondent had
already left the coumry. the court cannot rely on the revocation of that Order in considering the status of custody rights as of the <late
of the wrongful removal.
12
•

Docket No. 28. Ex. I 4(b).

·" See Petitioner's Reply Memorandum. Docket No. 31. Ex. 2. which is a Declaration by Petitioner's Mexican allorney clarifying these
points of Mexican law.

...,

Respondent's Opp'n. Exhibit l7(b) to Document No. 22. near end or first paragraph (emphasis added) .

.,-; The rvkxican mun reiterated in September 2011 that the ,u, exeat Order still applied. See Docket No. 4-1. Ex. 23(b). The court has
not considered this fact in determining whether the removal was wrongful hecause Respondent had already tlcd ivlcxico hy that time.
The Order. however. lends credence to the legal explanations of Petitioner's allorney in Mexico. as noted helmv.
11
• •

See Dockel No. 31. Ex. 2.

Page 8 of 14
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110630, *26
rights of custody under the Hague Convention. Accordingly,
Respondent's removal of the children from Mexico violated
Petitioner's rights of custody that arose under the laws of
Mexico and therefore, the removal was wrongful.
As noted previously, once a petitioner establishes that
removal was wrongful, the child must be returned unless an
exception is applicable. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990 (citing 42
U.S.C. § § I 1603(a)). Respondent, has asserted several
defenses available under the Hague Convention. which will
he addressed in turn below
C.

RESPONDENT'S DEFENSES

I. Article /3 "Grave Harm" Defense

Respondent contends that there is a grave risk that return of
the children would expose them to physical and/or
psychological harm. Pursuant to Article 13 of the
Convention, a court is not bound to order the return of
(*27) the child if the person who opposed the return
establishes that "there is a grave risk that his return would
expose the child to physical or psychological harm or
otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation." Art.
I 3(b). Respondent must establish the grave risk by "clear
and convincing" evidence. 42. U.S.C. § l l 603(e)(2).
A "grave risk" of harm from repatriation arises in two
situations: (I) where returning the child means sending him
to a zone of war, famine, or disease: or (2) in cases of
serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional
dependence, when the court in the country of habitual
residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or
unwilling to give the child adequate protection.
In addition, the potential harm to the child must be severe,
and "[t]he level of risk and danger required to trigger this
exception has consistently been held to be very high."
Norden-Powers v. Beveridge, 125 F. Supp. 2d 634, 640
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing cases). The grave risk involves not
only the magnitude of the potential harm but also the
probability that the harm will materialize. Van de Sande 1·.
Van de Sande, 43 I F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005).
47

In this case, Respondent has not established [*28] by clear
and convincing evidence that there is a grave risk that the
return of the children would expose them to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable
situation. The children would not be returned to a zone of
war. famine, or disease.
In addition, while Respondent has alleged that she and the
children were victims of domestic violence, the court is not
persuaded that these allegations are entirely true. 47 For
example, Respondent did not raise any such concerns
during her divorce proceedings. In fact, in her Answer to the
Complaint for Divorce, she states "there was an exchange of
insults. where today the plaintiff [Mr. Matas-Vidal] always
acted in a mocking way and although he had never
physically assaulted me, he did it with his attitudes." 48 This
Answer is dated November 22. 2007. well after the parties
separated on August 5, 2007. In addition, the psychological
reports submitted in this case do not suggest that Petitioner
was abusive toward his wife or children or that Respondent
reported any abuse al that time. Indeed. the initial
psychological report states that "with regard to the children,
I Petitioner] was identified with an affective bond
1*29) toward them, showing interest and concern for them,
affective and normative toward them, so there arc no
prnhlems for coexistence." 49 The final report reached the
same conclusion. 50
Indeed. the supplemental reports suggest that Respondent
had manipulated her children to dislike their father. Among
other things, the psychologist stated:
From analysis of obtained information at applied
instruments. there were not found significant data to
establish that minor children show fear attitudes to any
of their parents, becoming important the fact that even
though they openly express feeling certain dread to
their father, this results more consistent with induction
and manipulation attitudes to them than as a result of
their own experiences. 51
Also. while Respondent initially submitted a translation of
very negative comments the 1*30] children allegedly made

Even if some of the allegations are true. they have not hcen proven by clear and convincing evidence. and. in any event. the court
docs not find that they rise to a level of risk and danger that would justify applying this exception .

.ix

Docket No. 28-2. Ex. 4 <JI 9 (emphasis added).

19
•

Docket No. 28-9. Ex. 11.

-;o

Docket No. 4. pp. I 83. 19 I.

-;i

Docket No. 4-1. Ex. 2l(b) at p. 7.
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during a mediation. Petitioner pointed out that the translation
was completely inaccurate (and that it was a fraud upon the
court). 52 Respondent later filed Corrections, conceding that
the translation submitted was not actually a translation of
the mediation, but of other reports and hearings and that the
inadvertent mistake had been made due to language barriers
and time constraints. 53 During the mediation, no allegations
of abuse were raised, and when SM-L was questioned, he
declared he loved and wanted to visit with his father. His
negative comment to the court was that his father lied to the
boys by saying he would play with them, then did not. 54
The family pediatrician never noticed any type of evidence
that would suggest any type of physical abuse. 55 The
parties' marriage counselor has also provided an affidavit
stating that she saw no issues of violence between them, and
neither party mentioned any violence in the home. 56
The children's current (*31) fear of their father appears to
he based primarily (but not exclusively) on one alleged
"incident" involving each child. When SM-L was
sixteen-months old, Respondent claims that Petitioner pushed
him against a step in the bathroom, from which he sustained
a cut above his right eye and was seen by a plastic surgeon.
Petitioner claims that a shaky changing table gave way and
SM-L fell to the floor.
When RM-L was 15 months old, Respondent claims that
Petitioner pushed him into a chair resulting in eye injuries.
Petitioner denies that this happened. 57 While the court
cannot divine what actually happened in these various
alleged incidents. what is clear is that both children discussed
these events with the court as though they had clear

memories of the occurrences. which the court does not find
to be plausible. given their ages at the time. 58 They also
appear to have general recollections of their father choking
or spanking them. along with other instances of violence,
hut these allegations have not been proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
Moreover, the records submitted from the Supervised
Visitation Center suggest that. at first, the children did not
exhibit any fear or reluctance to see their father. Indeed,
they appeared to demonstrate a warm, loving, and playful
interaction. 59 Over time, however, they seemed to develop
more hesitation about [*33) seeing him. which he blames on
Ms. Libbey-Aguilcra's efforts to alienate the children from
him. The reason the children most often gave to the
supervisors about their reluctance to visit with their father
was that his breath was bad. It seems unlikely that the
children would provide such an answer if they were actually
subjected to physical or psychological abuse, and it is
puzzling that the children did not appear to have any
reluctance to sec their father during the beginning weeks or
months of their supervised visits. Indeed. even the Mexican
Court Order from J unc 30, 20 l 0, upon which Respondent
relies to argue that she was awarded sole custody. states that
"there is no danger" in "any of the parents exercising
custody" and stated that Mr. Matas- Vidal had "the obligation
and essential human right to visit and out with his minor
children" every other weekend. 60
It is not the function of this court. however. to determine

whether any domestic violence actually occurred. This court
must determine, in cases where "serious abuse or neglect"

Docket Nos. 30. 31.
5
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Docket 33, Corrections to Respondent's Exhibits. The court has no douht that the incorrect translation was inadvertently submitted.
Docket No. 30. Ex. I. 2.
Docket No. 30. Ex. 9.

5

<'

Id.

:,7

He also denies another incident alleged hy Respondent-that he slammed a piano cover shut. therehy injuring RM-L's face. In fact.
Petitioner claims [*32) that they never even had a piano.

-:.x Respondent also claims that Petitioner pushed RM-L into a pipe in the yard at the Supervision Center. splilling his lip. Petitioner
denies that this happened. and the Center Report from June 14. 2008 reported that Petitioner was playing with the children in the garden.
where they were playing ball and that RM-L accidentally struck his elbow on a tube serving. as a garden fence. There is also a note stating
that when Petitioner noticed it. he washed it with soap and water. See Docket No. 30. Ex. 10. Given that the visits were supervised and
that there is a contemporaneous note slating what happened. the court docs not give any credence lo Respondent· s version of this
incident. The court also docs not give credence to Respondent's claim that Petitioner's hrnthcr arrived at the Visitation Center in October
2009 to at1emp1 lo kidnap the children.

"''

See Docket 30. Ex. I 0.

w

Docket No. 28-13. Ex. I 4(b) al page 38 of 40.
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has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. whether
Mexico would be [*34) incapable or unwilling to provide
protection to the children. The court finds that Respondent
has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that
there is evidence of "serious abuse or neglect." and that even
if there were. she has not demonstrated that Mexican courts
would be incapable of providing adequate protection. Thus,
the court concludes that Article 13 "grave risk" defense does
not apply in this case.
ii. Article 20 "Public Policy" Defense

Article 20 of the Convention states, "The return of the child
under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this
would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the
requested State relating to the protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms." This is an affirmative defense
that Respondent must prove by clear and convincing
evidence. 42 U.S.C. § l I603(e)(2)(A). This is often referred
to as the "public policy" defense. The defense is to be
invoked only on "the rare occasion that return nf a child
would utterly shock the conscience of the court or offend all
notions of due process." Souratgar \'. Fair, 720 F.3d 96,
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11875, 2013 WL 2631375 at *8 (2nd
Cir. June 13, 2013) (quoting U.S. State Dcp't. Hague
International Child Abduction Convention: (*35) Text and
Legal Analysis, Pub. Notice 957. 51 Fed. Reg. I 0,494,
l 0,510 (Mar. 26, 1986)). "We note that this defense has yet
to be used by a federal court to deny a petition for
repatriation." Id. (citing Fed. Jud. Ctr., The I 980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction: A Guide for Judges 85 (2012)). The court finds
no merit to this defense and summarily denies it.
iii. Article 12 "Well-Settled" Defe11se

Article 12 provides, in relevant part:
Where a child has been wrongfully removed ... and. at
the date of the commencement of the proceedings
before the judicial or administrative authority of the
Contracting State where the child is. a period of less
than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful
removal or retention, the authority concerned shall
order the return of the child forthwith. The judicial or
administrative authority. even where the proceedings
have been commenced after the expiration of the period
of one year referred to in the proceeding paragraph,
shall also order the return of the child. unless it is
demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new
environment.
Art.

12 (emphasis added). Accordingly. the default

presumption under [*36] the Convention is that a child shall
be returned to the state from which he originally was
wrongfully removed unless both of two conditions arc met:
(I) one year has elapsed between the date of wrongful
removal and the date proceedings commence: and (2) the
child is found to be "now settled in its new environment."
Lozano v. Alvare-:., 697 F.3d 41, 51 (2nd Cir. 2012). In other
words, if more than one year has elapsed since the date of
wrongful removal and the child is now settled in his new
environment, the court may - but need not- refuse to
order repatriation. See Blo11di11 v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, I64
(2d Cir. 200 I). Put differently, "if more than one year has
passed. a 'demonstra[tion] that the child is now settled in its
new environment' may be a sufficient ground for refusing lo
order repatriation." Id. The standard under Article 12 does
not call for determining in which location the child is
relatively better settled, but rather for determining whether
the child has become so settled in a new environment that
repatriation would be against the child's hest interest. Id.
In determining whether a child is settled within the meaning
of Article I 2, a court considers a number of factors
[*37] that bear on whether the child has "significant
connections to the new country." 51 Fed. Reg. at l 0509.
These factors include: ( l) the child's age; (2) the stability
and duration of the child's residence in the new environment;
(3) whether the child attends school or day care consistently:
(4) whether the child has friends and relatives in the new
area; (5) the child's participation in community or
extracurricular school activities, such as team sports, youth
groups. or school clubs; and (6) the respondent's employment
and financial stability. In some circumstances, we will also
consider the immigration status of the child and the
respondent. In general, this consideration will be relevant
only if there is an immediate. concrete threat of deportation.
Although all of these factors. when applicable. may be
considered in the "settled" analysis, ordinarily the most
important is the length and stability of the child's residence
in the new environment. In Re B. Del C.S.B .. 559 F.3d 999.
I009 (9th Cir 2009)
In the instant case.SM-Land RM-L have been in Utah since
late December. 2010-- for over two and one-half years. The
court finds that they arc both very well settled. And given
the boys· 1*381 ages. 12 and 9 ½. respectively. these
thirty-plus months have been meaningful to the boys. They
have been consistently enrolled in school since January
2011. They have missed very few days during those two
school years. and their academic success has been
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remarkable. 61 Both boys have many friends, caring
neighbors, and fellow LOS church members with whom
they have formed close bonds. Their maternal grandmother
also frequently cares for them. The children arc active in
their church, in boy scouts (or cub scouts for RM-L), and
they are on a competitive swim team. SM-L is also on a
soccer team. Many friends and neighbors have provided
glowing letters about Respondent and the boys, and attesting
to the boys' happiness and stable environment. 62 Their
mother has also been consistently employed since March
2011 and appears to be financially stable. 63 They boys both
speak fluent English and appear to have adjusted well to
their living situation. Given the outpouring of support for
the boys and Respondent, both in terms of having friends
and neighbors attend the two court hearings and in submitting
letters to the court, the court has no question that these two
boys are surrounded by a loving [*39] and supportive
community and that the boys arc thriving in their current
environment. They are indeed settled in their new
environment.

a. Equitable Tolling
Petitioner argues [*40] that he is entitled to equitable tolling
of the one-year period for the filing of his Hague petition
and that the Article 12 defense is therefore inapplicable.
Article 12 of the Convention requires the return of a child,
whether or not he is "settled," if the non-abducting parent
files his Hague petition within one year of the child's
wrongful removal or retention. See Hague Convention, art.
12.
Some courts have held that equitable principles may be
applied to toll the one-year period when circumstances
suggest that the abducting parent took steps to conceal the
whereabouts of the child from the parent seeking return and
such concealment delayed the filing of the petition for
return." See, e.g., Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563,570 (9th
Cir. 2008). Relying on this holding, Petitioner contends that,

even if the court finds the boys to be "now settled," the court
should nevertheless order their return because Respondent
concealed the boys and because Petitioner filed his petition
within one year of learning of their location. While the court
agrees that Respondent concealed the boys, that such
concealment delayed Petitioner's ability to file a petition,
and that he filed his petition [*41] within one year after he
finally learned of their location, the court declines to apply
equitable tolling to the one-year mandatory return period.
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals are divided on
the issue of equitable tolling in this situation. The Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have found
that equitable tolling may apply in certain circumstances,
such as when circumstances suggest that the abducting
parent took steps to conceal the whereabouts of the children
and the concealment caused the petitioning parent's filing
delay. See Dietz v. Dietz, 349 Fed. Appx. 930, 2009 WL
3378590 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 2009); /11 re B. Del C.S.B., 559
F.3d at 1014; Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570 (9th Cir. 2008);
Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 , 723-24 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has
concluded that equitable tolling found that it does not apply.
See Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 51 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert.
grallfed in part, 133 S. Ct. 2851, 186 L. Ed. 2d 907 (June
24, 2013). The Tenth Circuit has not addressed the issue.
Because of the split among the Circuits, the United States
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the issue, and
thus the issue will be decided within the next [*42] term. 64
In the meantime, however, this court agrees with the Second
Circuit and other district courts that have found that the
purpose of the one-year mandatory return period is not to
provide a deadline for a petitioner to assert a claim but
rather is to put a limit on the uprooting of a settled child. As
one district court explained, "the evident import of [Article
12's one-year periodj is not so much to provide a potential
plaintiff with a reasonable time to assert any claims, as a
statute of limitations docs, hut rather to put some limit on

61

For example. their school principal has written a glowing review of hoth hoys. stating, among other things. that "they both arc among
the very best behaved and well-mannered students I have known in school during my 13 years as a teacher and 15 years as a public school
administrator. They have excellent attendance, including never being tardy lo school the entire past year. and they have never required
any attendant or behavior interventions from the school or their teachers." In addition. he stated that both "regularly arc recognized and
receive awards in our quarterly recognition celebrations for going "above and beyond" in numerous ways. and in every way they are
exemplary students and citizens." He also notes that "they are thriving and happy in school. and they are well on their way to being happy.
productive. and successful citizens. I have absolutely no concerns about them or their well-being." See Docket No. 28. Ex. 2 IJ. Letter
from School Principal. dated June 26. 2013.
62

See Docket No. 28. Ex. 26.
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Alvarez. 133 S. Ct. 2851. 186 L. Ed. 2d 907 (June 24. 2013 ).
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the uprooting of a settled child." Toren v. Toren, 26 F. Supp.
2d 240, 244 (D. Mass.1998), opinion vacated on other
grounds by Toren v. Toren, 191 F.3d 23 (1st Cir.1999); see
also Perez-Vera Report 'II l 07.
The district court in Lozano found that, unlike a statute of
limitations prohibiting a parent from filing a return petition
after a year has expired, the "settled" defense merely
permits courts to consider the interests of a child who has
been in a new environment for more than a year before
ordering that child to be returned to her country of habitual
residency. See Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 227-28
[*43] (reasoning that the one-year period in Article 12 is not
analogous to a statute of limitations); see also Aranda v.
Serna, 911 F. Supp. 2d 601,613 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (finding
the reasoning of the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
unpersuasive and agreeing with Second Circuit that equitable
tolling docs not apply to equitably toll the one-year period
based on concealment); Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d
189, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10960, 2013 WL 322204 (D.
N.H. Jan. 28, 2013) (same); Matovski v. Matovski, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65519, 2007 WL 2600862, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (concluding that one-year period
is not analogous to a statute of limitations); Anderson v.
Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (same);
Toren v. Toren, 26 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244 (D. Mass.1998)
(same), vacated on other grounds, 191 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. I 999).
Even the Ninth Circuit, while still applying equitable
tolling, recognized that "[t]he rationale behind Article 12's
"now settled" defense is that when a child has become
settled and adjusted in his new environment, a forced return
might only serve to cause him further distress and accentuate
the harm caused by the wrongful relocation." In re B. Del C.
S. B., 559 F.3d 999, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Beaumont
& McEleavy, [*44] The Hague Convention on International
Child Abduction 203 ( 1999)).
The Second Circuit, in a well-researched and well-reasoned
opinion, rejected the petitioner's argument on appeal that
the district court should have equitably tolled the one-year
filing period until the date he reasonably could determine
that his daughter had been removed from the United
Kingdom and taken to the United States. Lozano, 697 F.3d
at 50-51. The Second Circuit recognized that:

While the text of the Convention does not explicitly
address the issue, we note that the text does provide one
clue that tolling was not anticipated. The language of
Article 12 expressly starts the running of the one-year
period "from the date of the wrongful removal or
retention." It would have been a simple matter, if the
state parties to the Convention wished to take account
of the possibility that an abducting parent might make
it difficult for the petitioning parent to discover the
child's whereabouts, to run the period "from the date
that the petitioning parent learned [or, could reasonably
have learned] of the child's whereabouts." But the
drafters did not adopt such language .... [T]he drafting
history demonstrates that this [*45] was a conscious
choice, and that the drafters specifically rejected a
proposal to have a different date trigger the start of the
one-year period when the child's whereabouts had been
concealed.

Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 51 n. 8 (2nd Cir. 2012)
(internal citations omitted). The Lozano court also found
that this interpretation of Article 12 "is further bolstered by
Article 18, which provides that none of the provisions in the
Convention "limit the power of a judicial or administrative
authority to order the return of the child at any time."
Lozano, 697 F.3d at 52 n. l O (citing Convention, art. 18).
Moreover, the Lozano court also relied on the Perez-Vera
Report 65 and concluded that:
Simply put, the Convention is not intended to promote
the return of a child to his or her country of habitual
residency irrespective of that child's best interests;
rather, the Convention embodies the judgment that in
most instances, a child's welfare is best served by a
prompt return to that country. The signatory states,
however, were aware that there are situations where
"the removal of the child can ... be justified by objective
reasons which have to do either with [the child's]
person, or with the [*46J environment with which [the
child] is most closely connected." Perez-Vera Report
at 432 (l[ 25. Accordingly, the Convention "recognizes
the need for certain exceptions" to the signatory states'
"general obligation[] ... to secure the prompt return of
children who have been unlawfully removed or
retained." Id. Perez-Vera describes these "exceptions"

,,:-; As noted by the Second Circuit. Elisa Perez-Vera was "the official Hague Conference reporter for the Convention." Lo~ano. 697
F.3d at 52 n. I I (quoting Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis. 51 Fed. Reg. at I 0.503). "Her
explanatory report !was[ recognized by the Conference as the official history and commentary f*47] on the Convention." id.. and we
have previously held that "it is an authoritative source for interpreting the Convention's provisions." id. (citing Cm//, . Croll. 229 F.3d
133. 137 n. 3 (2d Cir.2000)) (citation omitted). abroga!ed 011 orher grounds by Abbo/1. 560 U.S. I. 130 S. Ct. 1983. 176 L. Ed. 2d 789:
see also Giller. 396 F.3d at 129 & n. 4.

Page 13 of 14
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS I 10630. *46
as "concrete illustrations of the overly vague principle
whereby the interests of the child are stated to be the
guiding criterion in this area."

Id. at 53-54; see also Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 164
(2nd Cir. 2001) (" Blondin II") (noting that the Convention's
drafters recognized that, despite the general aim of
"ensur[ing] the return of abducted children." there "could
come a point at which a child would become so settled in a
new environment that repatriation might not be in its best
interest.").
In sum, the Second Circuit determined that the Convention's
drafting history "strongly supports the position that the
one-year period in Article 12 was designed to allow courts
to take into account a chikJ's interest in re,naining in the
country to which he has been abducted after a certain
amount of time has passed." 697 F.3d at 54. The court
concluded that, [ijf this understanding of the second
paragraph of Article 12 is correct. allowing equitable tolling
of the one-year period would undermine its purpose. A child
may develop an interest in remaining in a country in which
she has lived for a substantial amount of time regardless of
her parents' efforts to conceal or locate her." See Lo-:,a110,
697 F.3d at 54. This court agrees.
While the court acknowledges that it may seem unfair and
inequitable to Petitioner that the Respondent has essentially
been "rewarded" for successfully [*48) hiding her children,
the alternative determination-to uproot these two boys
after they have become so well settled in their new
environment in which they have spent the past two and
one-half years-seems even more reprehensible and contrary
to the ultimate purpose of the Hague Convention. Thus, the
court declines to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to
the Article 12 "well-settled" defense.

iv. The Article 13 "Age and Maturity" Exception
The Hague Convention provides that "[ tlhc judicial or
administrative authority [considering a petition! may also
refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child
objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree
of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its
views." Hague Convention, art. 13. The age and maturity
exception is to be narrowly construed and must he shown by
a preponderance of the evidence. England r. England. 234
F.3d 268. 272 (5th Cir.2000) (citing §§ 1160 I (a)( 4 ).
11603( e)(2 )( A)).
In applying the "age and maturity" exception. a court must
not focus solely on the general goal of the Convention-to

protect children from the harmful effects of wrongful
removal-but must also carefully determine [*49) that the
particular child "'has obtained an age and degree of maturity
at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.'"
8/011di11 ,,. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240. 247 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting
Convention. art. 13). The Convention contains no age limit
for applying the exception. Blo11di11 II, 238 F.3d at 167;
Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro, 131 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (E.
D. Mich.2001 ).
In this case, SM-Lis twelve-years old and will start seventh
grade next month. RM-L will be ten-years old in three
months and will soon start fourth grade. The court had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor and maturity of both
children during the court's in camera interview of each of
them. Undoubtedly the task of meeting alone with a federal
judge and his staff. with no parents or attorneys present, was
a daunting one, but both boys faced the situation
courageously. They both demonstrated a high level of
maturity in answering the court's questions-answering the
questions in an articulate, thoughtful, and respectful manner.
They arc both good students with strong academic records.
They both expressed a strong desire to remain in Utah and
had particular objections to returning to Mexico. They
confirmed that [*50] they enjoy going to school here. they
arc involved in church and several sports activities, and they
have many friends here. Indeed, both boys became visibly
distraught when the court discussed the court's task of
evaluating whether they should be returned to Mexico. The
response of both boys appeared to be purely genuine-not
concocted or rehearsed in any way. Additionally. the boys
were adamant about not wanting to have a supervised visit
their father while he was in town for the instant court
proceeding.
Accordingly. the court finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence. that the boys arc of an appropriate age and
maturity such that it is appropriate for the court to take into
account their desire to not return to Mexico.
If a court determines. however, that the youngster's opinion
is the product of undue influence. the child's wishes arc not
taken into account. Desilw1. 481 F.3d at 1286. Herc. the
court recognizes that the hoys have spent the past two years
solely with their mother and maternal grandmother. and that
this circumstance has undoubtedly had an impact on their
desire to stay with their mother in Utah. It is also possible
that their mother has negatively colored the hoys' 1*511 view
of their father. Herc. while the children's objections to
returning to Mexico could he due to the mother's possible
undue influence over them. the court finds that this possible
undue influence is not the only reason the children desire
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not to return to Mexico, and thus. the court declines to
ignore their wishes. The children appear to be genuinely
happy and thriving in their current situation. The court has
attempted to balance this possible undue influence against
other reasons the boys desire to stay here and concludes that
even though the mother has perhaps exerted some undue
influence on the boys, the court should still take into
account the children· s wishes to remain in Utah and not be
returned to Mexico. For this independent reason, the court
declines to return them to Mexico.
The court's decision in this case is not based in any way on
a belief that the courts of Utah will do a better job than the
courts of Mexico City in addressing this unfortunate custody
situation. To the contrary, the court is certain that the courts
of Mexico City would be fully capable of handling this
litigation. In addition. the court has no doubt that Petitioner
genuinely wants to sec his children [*52) and have a
relationship with them. and the court hopes such a
relationship can develop in the future. The court, however,
is convinced that the return of these children to Mexico City
at this time and under these circumstances-however
wrongfully the circumstances have arisen-would severely
traumatize these children. The court emphasizes that this
decision has a limited purpose and effect. It does not mean

that Petitioner cannot exercise his visitation rights with his
children. It merely establishes that the boys will not be
returned to Mexico but will remain in Utah for any custody
proceedings that are initiated here. In light of the pending
Extradition proceedings against Respondent, however, the
future remains uncertain for this family.
V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
the Petition for Immediate Return of Children to Petitioner
Pursuant to the Hague Convention and the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act is DENIED. The Clerk of
the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Respondent.
DATED this 5th day of August, 20 I 3.
BY THE COURT:

Isl Dale A. Kimball
DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District Judge
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BROOKE ROBINSON
(a.k.a. SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEYAGUILERA),

ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION

Petitioner,
CASE

V.

JUAN PABLO MATAS-VIDAL,

No. 134100249

JUDGE CHRISTINE JoHNSON
CoMM1ss10NER THOMAS PATTON

Respondent.

THIS MATTER came before the Court on October 20, 2014, for hearing on the
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Respondent Juan Pablo Matas-Vidal
("Father") was not present, but was represented by counsel of record, David S. Dolowitz and
Shane A. Marx of the Jaw firm Dowwrrz HuNN1cun, PLLC. Petition Brooke Robinson, a.k.a.
Susan Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera ("Mother"), was not present, but was represented by counsel of

-1 ,...,,

n

record, Don R. Petersen of the law firn1 HowARD,

LEWIS

& PETERSEN, P.C .. Having received the

parties' pleadings and heard their respective arguments, upon the basis of record herein and for
good cause otherwise appearing, THE COURT HEREBY FINDS, CONCLUDES, AND
ORDERS, as follows:

I.

Mother's oral motion to continue the hearing is DENIED.

2.

All motions in domestic cases come before commissioners pursuant to URCP

IO 1, and the deadlines therein govern the timeliness of the parties' pleadings. Contrary to
Mother's assertions, the deadlines of URCP 7 do not apply at this stage of proceedings. Father's
reply was timely filed under URCP IO I. Moreover, Mother's absence due to her recent
incarceration does not warrant a continuance. The issue of jurisdiction is a matter of law, and
Mother's presence is not necessary for the Court's determination on the matter.
3.

Father's Motion to Dismiss for Lack ofJurisdiction is GRANTED.

4.

The Court is concerned by the suggestion of the federal court in the proceedings it

conducted with respect to this family under the Hague Convention and the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act that "the boys will not be returned to Mexico but will remain in Utah
for

any

custody

proceedings

initiated

here."

Matas-Vidal

v.

Libbey-Aguilera,

No.

2:13CV422DAK, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 110630 at *52 (D. Utah Aug. 5, 2013).
5.

A federal court cannot confer jurisdiction on Utah to conduct child custody

proceedings and a federal district court judge cannot determine what jurisdiction Utah has or can
maintain. Only Utah state-court judges can make a binding detem1ination of their own
jurisdiction.

2

") ,...f ()

6.

Utah's jurisdiction for custody proceedings is determined by the Utah Uniform

Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA 11 ) , Utah Code §§ 78B-13-101 et.
seq.
7.

The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the federal court's suggestion that

this Court has jurisdiction to conduct child custody proceedings, and the federal court's statement
is that regard is not binding on this Court. This Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA was
not an issue, was not litigated, and was not adjudicated in the proceedings held by federal court.
The federal court's stated assumption that this Court had jurisdiction is not entitled to any
deference.

8.

The federal court's ruling is valid except to the extent that it implies this Court has

jurisdiction to conduct child custody proceedings.
9.

The Court finds that Mexico had jurisdiction in October 2007 when child custody

proceedings were initiated in the 36th Court of Family Matters in the Federal District of Mexico
in case number 1427/2007 and that the subsequent bifurcation in the 24th Court of Family
Matters in the Federal District of Mexico in case number 1529/2010 further confirmed that
jurisdiction and reserved the parties custodial rights as subject to further litigation therein in
November 2010.
10.

Mexico reserved the right to enter additional order regarding the custody of these

children, and no Mexico court has vacated that order or otherwise unreserved the right to
conclude custody proceedings there.
1 1.

The fact that Mother thereafter fled the jurisdiction-even if she believed she was
3

authorized to do so-does not change the fact that there were pending child custody proceedings
in Mexico at the time.
12.

Mexico had child custody jurisdiction. It had jurisdiction over both parties, it had

home-state jurisdiction over the children, and it had jurisdiction of the child custody action
pending before it. Such jurisdiction is continuing and exclusive in nature. Mexico never gave up
or abandoned it jurisdiction over its prior orders or the various proceedings that remain pending
there.
13.

Pursuant to Utah Code § 788-13-105( I), "A court of this state shall treat a foreign

country as a state of the United States for purposes of applying [the UCCJEA]." The Court does
not find that this case is significantly different than if this was a New York case. If this happened
in New York and temporary orders were entered there, and then, for whatever reason, one of the
parents left the State of New York and the courts of New York delayed proceeding on custody
issues because that party had absconded, but the New York courts otherwise reserved the right to
enter additional orders and reserved its jurisdiction until the absconding party could be found,
there is no basis to assume that New York had given up or otherwise abandoned its jurisdiction.
14.

In such a case, the New York court is perfectly within its discretion to delay

proceedings or enforcement of existing orders until the absconding party reappears before it. The
4¼.,·

fact that the party may have absconded to Utah from New York and stayed here, regardless of
how long, does not change the continuing and exclusive nature of New York's jurisdiction over
any child custody proceedings.
15.

Pursuant to Utah Code

~

78B-13-206( 1), "a court of this state may not exercise its
4
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jurisdiction ... at the time of the commencement of the proceeding a proceeding concerning the
custody of the child had been previously commenced in a court of another state having
jurisdiction substantially in conformity with [the UCCJEA]." If Mother wants to address the
parties' custodial rights with regard to these children, her remedy is to return to Mexico and
participate in the child custody proceedings pending there.
16.

If Mother desires to modify the parties existing custodial rights, as articulated in

the orders from Mexico, she must seek such modification in the courts of Mexico. "[A] court of
this state may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state unless
... neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently resides in the other
state." Utah Code § 78B-13-203(2). Father continues to reside in Mexico, and the courts there
retain continuing exclusive jurisdiction over modification of their orders.
17.

The Court would certainly never find that judges or commissioners in Utah are

smarter than judges or commissioners in New York. But that is exactly what Mother is asking
this Court to do. Mother is asking the Court to declare that because we are dealing with Mexico,
that the courts there do not have exclusive ongoing jurisdiction. This Court is not willing to rule
that it is smarter or better than the judges and courts in Mexico, which routinely deal with
Mexican issues, Mexican children, and a Mexican divorces. 1t appears to this Court, in every
way, shape, and form that Mexico has never given up its ongoing exclusive jurisdiction.
Therefore, this Court must recognize Mexico's ongoing exclusive jurisdiction over custody
proceedings and orders with respect to these children.
18.

Additionally, criminal charges of Child Trafficking have been pending against
5
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Mother in the Thirteenth District Court of Federal Penal Process for the Federal District in case
number 85/20 I 2, since she fled Mexico with the children. Mother fails to acknowledge that the
criminal case for Child Trafficking is a further exercise and manifestation of Mexico's continuing
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct custody proceedings under the UCCJEA, and therefore this
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain simultaneous proceedings until such criminal charges are
resolved, pursuant to Utah Code § 788-13-206.
19.

If convicted of the pending criminal charges in Mexico, Mother's parental rights

will be terminated. The UCCJEA defines "child custody proceeding" to include any proceedings
in which "termination of parental rights" is at issue. Id. § 788-13-102(4 ). Furthermore, the
determination of Mother's legal and physical custody rights over the parties' minor children and
the extent to which her actions were justified are at the very heart of the Child Trafficking
criminal case. Under the UCCJEA, these are all child custody determination reached through
child custody proceedings. See also, In re Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38,

~ii

16-17 (defining "custody

proceeding" under UCCJEA's federal parallel, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, as
broadly including any proceeding regarding "actual possession and control of a child" or that
"divests a natural parent of all parental rights, including the rights of custody"). This Court
cannot exercise its jurisdiction to create a new legal defense for Mother or to otherwise allow her
to evade the judicial processes in Mexico that she seeks to avoid. Consequently, Utah lacks the
authority to conduct simultaneous child custody proceedings until-at the very least-Mother's
Child Trafficking criminal charges are resolved.
20.

Moreover, Mother's actions have eliminated any claim that this situation warrants
6
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the exercise of emergency jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78B- 13-204. Under subsection 204(3 ),
this Court's exercise of any emergency jurisdiction is limited, and "any order issued by a court of
this state under this section shall specify in the order a period of time which the court considers
adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having
jurisdiction." Further, "[t]he order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is obtained
from the other state within the period specified or the period expires." Id. § 78B-13-204(3 ). This
Court likely would have exercised such jurisdiction to allow Mother to return to Mexico to
address the orders and proceedings pending there. However, this action was filed on November
18, 2013. We are now I I months down the road, and more than a year past the time when the
federal court made its order. There no longer exists any basis for the exercise of emergency
jurisdiction. We are well past that point, and the Court cannot excuse the fact that Mother has not
returned to the Court of original ongoing jurisdiction and addressed the pending proceedings or
otherwise obtained a new order there.
21.

Alternatively, even if this Court had a basis to exercise jurisdiction it declines to

do so as a result of Mother's unjustifiable conduct. Pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-13-208(1 ), "if a
court of this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a person invoking the jurisdiction
has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction." It is
uncontested that Mother fled the tenitorial jurisdiction of Mexico when proceedings and orders
were still pending there, and that she has refused to return or otherwise engage in the judicial
process there. This Court will not condone or otherwise overlook Mother's apparent attempts to
evade and her unwillingness to engage in the judicial processes in Mexico. Even if there were
7
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some arguable basis for jurisdiction herein, the Court will neither exercise emergency nor
general child custody jurisdiction over these children because Mother has made every effort to
avoid the jurisdiction of the courts in Mexico, and frustrated the ability of the courts of Mexico
to conclude the custody proceedings there. In essence, Mother has engaged in unjustifiable
conduct, and she asks this Court to exercise jurisdiction over issues she has refused to address,
but that she could have and should have pursued and concluded in Mexico months ago.

This Order is signed and entered when e/ectro11ically stamped and dated
by the Court at the top of the first page.

Approved as to form:
Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Don R. Petersen
Allorneyfor Petitioner
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RULE 7(0 NOTICE
Pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, I hereby certify that a true
and correct copy of the above form of Order ofDismissal.for Lack of Jurisdiction was served on
November 10, 2014, by the means and to the parties indicated in the following Certificate of
Service. Notice of objections as to the form of this order must be submitted to the Court and
counsel within seven (7) days after service. Should no objections to this order be submitted to
the Court and counsel within seven (7) days after service, this form of order shall be presented to
the Court for entry and signature.

Isl Shane A. Marx

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 10, 2014 I caused the foregoing to be served,
pursuant to UTAH R. C1v. P. 5(b), on the following person(s), by the means indicated herein.
___
___
___
___

U.S. Regular Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
E-Mail
--'---X_____ E-Filing

Don R. Petersen
How ARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorney for Petitioner
120 E. 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
Tel:
(801) 373-6345
Fax:
(801) 377-4991
Email: petersend@provolawyers.com

Isl Shane A. Marx
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AddendumC
Order Overruling Petitioner's Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation Dated
3/ 17/2015

. . f '\~'... '. ;:i:;•-~.

The Order of Court is stated below:
/ . ,,'-~~,-:i'.,:: ~.
: .
5.:::.. . .• ~·
Dated: March 17, 2015
Isl Christipe JgJm~p.~: · I
0 l :29:04 PM
Districf-~ourfJutig~ /
I~/;·.\ ~\'->/
•---.,..,,.,.,,~;ill.11 •

·<r

David S. Dolowitz (Utah Bar No. 0899)
James M. Hunnicutt (Utah Bar No. 9341)
Shane A. Marx (Utah Bar No. 13293)
DoLOWITZ HtJNNICUTT, PLLC
299 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel:
(801) 535-4340
Fax: (801) 535-4346
Email: sandy@dolowitzhunicutt.com
jim@dolowitzhunnicutt.com
shane@dolowitzhunnicutt.com
Attorneys.for Respondent

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BROOKE ROBINSON
(a.k.a. SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEYAGUILERA),

ORDER OVERRULING PETITIONER'S
OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner,
C.\sE No. 134100249

V.

JUAN PABLO MATAS-VIDAL,

]t.;DGE CHRISTINE JoHNSON

Co:-.1:-.uss101'ER THOMAS

PATT01'

Respondent.

THIS MATTER came before the Honorable Christine Johnson on March 5, 2015 for
hearing on Petitioner's O~jection to Commissioner's Recommendation Re: Respondent's Motion
to Dismiss for Lake of Jurisdiction (Hearing October 20, 2014), filed on November 3, 2014

pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure I08. Petitioner Brooke Robinson, also known as Susan
Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera, was present and represented by counsel of record, Don R. Petersen of

1\,1,..,.,-,h -17

0f\"1C f'l-1,")f'I nl\i1

the law firm Howard, Lewis & Petersen, PC. Respondent Juan Pablo Matas-Vidal was not
present, but was represented by counsel of record, David S. Dolowitz and Shane A. Marx of the
law firm Dolowitz Hunnicutt, PLLC. Having heard argument, upon the basis of record herein,
and for good cause otherwise appearing, THE COURT HEREBY FINDS, CONCLUDES,

AND ORDERS THAT:
1.

Petitioner's objection to the Commissioner's recommendation, announced after

hearing on October 20, 2014, and Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, entered on
December 5, 2014, is OVERRULED or otherwise DENIED.
2.

The Commissioner's recommendation contained in the Order of Dismissal for

Lack of Jurisdiction, entered on December 5, 2014, is accurate and appropriate, and the Court
hereby adopts the analysis contained therein.

3.

There are both civil and criminal proceedings pending in Mexico wherein the

custody of the parties' minor children and the parties' parental rights remain at issue. This
indicates to the Court that Mexico has not abandoned and otherwise continues to exercise
jurisdiction over issues of child custody. Consequently, this Court is without and otherwise
declines to assert child custody jurisdiction. This determination is informed by the Court's
reading of the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, Utah Code §§ 78B-

l 3-101 et seq., the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A.

* 1738A, and

Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 ).
4.

The Ver[fied Petition to Establish Custody of Minor Children, Payment of Child

2

I
Q'J

Support and Alimony, Entry of Restraining Order, and.for Attorney Fees, filed on November I 8,

!

I

I
2013 by Petitioner Brooke Robinson, also known as Susan Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera, is hereby

~

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

This Order is sig11ed a11d e11tered whe11 electro11ical/y stamped and dated by the
Court at the top of the first page.

Approved as to form:
Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Don R. Petersen
Attorney.for Petitioner

3
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RULE 7(0 NOTICE
Pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, I hereby certify that a true
and correct copy of the above form of order was served on March 6, 2015, by the means and to
the parties indicated in the following Certificate of Service. Notice of objections as to the form
of this order must be submitted to the Court and counsel within seven (7) days after service.
Should no objections to this order be submitted to the Court and counsel within seven (7) days
after service, this form of order shall be presented to the Court for entry and signature.
Isl Shane A. Marx

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 6, 2015, I caused the foregoing to be served,
pursuant to UTAH R. Ov. P. 5(b ), on the following person(s), by the means indicated herein.
Don R. Petersen
HOWARD, LEWIS &

_ _ _ U.S. Regular Mail
_ _ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ _ Facsimile Transmission
--=-X-"--_ E-Mail
--=-X-"--_ E-Fi Ii ng

PETERSEJ\, PC

Attorney for Petitioner
120 E. 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
Tel:
(801) 373-6345
Fax:
(801) 377-4991
Email: pctcrsend@provolawyers.com

Isl Shane A. Marx
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AddendumD
Ruling and Order on Petitioner's Motion to
Amend Order Dated 4/30/2015

FILED

~

APR 3 0 2015
4THDIST~
STATE OF
UTAH COUNTY

~

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING AND ORDER ON
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
AMEND ORDER

BROOKE ROBINSON,
Petitioner,

Case No. 134100249

vs.

Date: April 28, 2015

JUAN PABLO MATAS-VIDAL,

Judge Christine S. Johnson

Respondent.

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Amend, filed
together with a supporting memorandum on March 31, 2015. Respondent filed
his Opposition on April 14, 2015. There was no reply. Neither party having
requested a hearing, Respondent submitted the motion for decision on April 22,
2015. Having reviewed the submissions of the parties, and being advised of the
applicable rules and the governing law, the Court denies the motion, based
upon the following:
The Court entered its Order Overruling Objection to Commissioner's
Recommendation on March 17, 2015. Petitioner filed her present motion within
14 days, as required. Petitioner seeks relief pursuant to Rule 59, which allows
for an amendment to judgment under specified grounds: to correct irregularity
in the proceedings, misconduct by the jury, accident or surprise, newly
Page 1 of 2

discovered evidence, excessive or inadequate damages, insufficiency of the
evidence, or error. See URCP 59(a). Additionally, Petitioner cites to Rule 52,
which permits the court to "amend its findings or make additional findings and
may amend the judgment accordingly." URCP 52{b). A decision to alter or
amend judgment lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See College
Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Utah 1989).
In Petitioner's memorandum, she devotes significant time to restating
facts which have been previously presented. She then argues that the Court
should amend its prior judgment, relying upon prior error as grounds for
amending judgment under Rule 59. However, the arguments asserted are not
new and are no more persuasive now then they were when presented initially.
Because Petitioner's objection to the Commissioner and this Court's decision
regarding jurisdiction has been fully heard and considered, this Court declines
to exercise its discretion to amend judgment under Rule 59.
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner's motion to amend judgment is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
This Ruling shall stand as the Order of the Court. Pursuant to Rule 7, no
further order is required.

DATED this

2fJ

day of April, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

certificate of mailing is on the following page.

Page 2 of 2

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 134100249 by the method and on the date specified.

~

EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

DAVID
JAMES
SHANE
DON R

s DOLOWITZ sandy@dolowitzhunnicutt.com
M HUNNICUTT jim@dolowitzhunnicutt.com
A MARX shane@dolowitzhunnicutt.com
PETERSEN petersend@provolawyers.com

04/30/2015

/s/ LEISHA MEDINA

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk

Printed: 04/30/15 09:16:30
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AddendumE
Order Dated 2/8/2013 Dismissing Main
Action in Mexico and Rescinding Prior
Orders

. (@
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SUPERIOR

SUPeAIOR COURT OF JUSTIC! OF M FEDERAL DlSTRICf

COURT

(ILLEGlBLE)

OF JUSTICE

(IUIGIBU?J

OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT

TlflRTY•Snmt OF TH! FAMIUAR

~

Mexico, Federal District the ef1ht of February of two thousand thirteen.

(.ii}
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Gfven new account In the present case, and ta kins Into conslderatlon that Justice must be prompt
and expeditious, and tn order to comply fully with the prtnclple of congruence that must preval\
with the Judicial charges, In the sense that once you notice any involuntary error, you must be
corrected, to not prevail In the same, so that In such tessltura and In response to that of records of
the case warns, that Mr. JUAN PABLO MATAS VIDAL through wrftlng submitted the eleven of
October In the year two thousand and seven, In the Oflclalla Common Clvll-Famlllar , sued SUSAN
CONSUELO LIBBEY AGUILERA In the ordinary dvfl route, as main action the necessary divorce as
well as various benefits notwithstanding the foregoing, Mr. JUAN PABLO MATAS VIDAL, again
Instituted divorce uncaused proceedings against SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY AGUILERA which
settled under the number 1529/2010, In the Familiar Court Twenty.fourth In this H. Court,
according to/and consists of the certified copies that were sent by the holder of the said Court of
which even ln addition warns that on the hearing dated twenty-fifth day of November of the year
two thousand ten, was Issued the resolution that proceeded In accordance with the law, In which
ft dissolved the marriage bond and In addition they were separated except their rfghts to that In
the corresponding life lncldental to assert what appropriate to Its right In relation to the proposal
and counter proposal of convention, so In that vein and In response to that as It was pointed out In
previous ffnes the main action of the trfal that we are dealing with It was the necessary divorce, so
that when being demonstrated that such action was exercised by the same plaintiff and even
executed by diverse Judge, because It does not have to pass unnoticed that the sworn statement
of marriage that work In performances (Page 435) comprises the relevant entry to the dlssolut1on
of the marriage bond In which case we have to the object of his action was precrsely to dissolve
the marriage bond that unites them, Therefore It Is left WITHOUT EFFECTS EACH AND EVERY ONE
OF THE PROVISIONAl MEASURES ordered during the aftermath procedural, such as
GUARDIANSHIP AND PROVISIONAL CUSTODY of the minor SANTIAGO and RODRIGO surname
MATAS-UBBEY ln favor of SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY AGUILERA; as well as the PROVISIONAL
AUMONY decreed In favor of SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY AGUILERA and minors SANTIAGO and
RODRIGO surname MATAS-LIBBEY In charge of JUAN PABLO MATAS VIDAL; the REGIME OF
PROVISIONAL VISITS In favor of JUAN PABLO MATAS VIDAL with their minor children SANTIAGO
and RODRIGO surname MATAS -LIBBEY; and the use of.the family home In favor of Mrs. SUSAN
CONSUELO UBBEY AGUILERA and Its above mentioned minor children, which were decreed In an

'
Interlocutory Judgment the fourteenth day of December of two thousand seven, as amended In
the Judgment of the seventh of May of two thousand eight, By the H Third Family Room of this H.
Court, as well as the diverse variation dated twenty-two of October two thousand efght, carried
out by the same authority In compllance with the Judgment pronounced by the Judge of the ninth
district In Civil Matters In the Federal District.
However, with the understanding that such prlvlleges wlll be able to be asserted In the track and
in right way to proceed before the competent authority to d~ so, ~nd before the appropriate c.
Judge, with the understanding that at any time you must safeguard the best Interests of their
minor children, any time that In accordance with the provisions of article 4 Constitutional
Convention of the rlgnts of the Child, the Law for the Protection of Chlldren and Adolescents, and
the Law of the rights of children, the ~hlldren have the right to a family llfe In harmony, to be loved
and respected by their parents and to a healthy co-existence with both, especially since that Is
where It should be the preferred application of the law, understood by preference the
circumstance that exalts the Interest of children above all else, and given the Importance of the
interests that save this type of subjective right, that Is precisely the relatlonshlp between parents
and children, generator of reciprocal rights and duties, always conceived of the protection In
function of the children, subjective right that has the features to be a duty an obHgatl(?n which
could not be excused and the same must be done personally, because It represents a positive duty
to continued treatment which requires a constant and effective deployment of a conduct which
has the responsiblllty to the parental authority, where the parents have an obligation to ensure
their chlldren and keep them In your company, support them, educate them and give them an
integral formation as parental authority, Involves not only rights, but also duties on all the Interest
and the protection of minors, thus, ft Is necessary to mention the Decree (llleglble) on the right of
the chlld, publlshed In the Official Journal of the Federation on the twenty-fifth day of January one
thousand nine hundred and ninety-one, that of any (lllegl~le) signed expected to arrive to
understand both sides, as sound people that are and can analyze taking awareness, of the harm It
is causing their minor children, emphasizing that the "family" as the fundamental group of the
society and the natural environment for the growth and welfare of all Its members and In
partfcular their children should receive the necessary protection and assistance to fully assume Its
responstbllltles within the community, recognizing also that the child for the full and harmonious
development of his personality must grow up In a family environment In an atmosphere of
happiness, love and understanding and conslder1ng that the child should be fully prepared for an
Independent llfe In society and be educated In the spirit of the Ideals" ... also bearing in mind that
as indicated In the Declaration of the Rights of the Child the child by Its lack of physical and mental
maturity you need special attention and care, Including appropriate legal protection, both before
and after birth Is agreed at the above Convention situations that come precisely to protect the
best Interests of the children In the must lie the preferential appllcatlon of the law, convention In
which a chfld means every human being below the age of eighteen years of age according to deals
with the artfcle 1, It also emerges that the numeral following the rights set forth In the Convention
In question 1ts application to ensure each chlld subject to their Jurfsdlction, without distinction,
regardless of race, color, sex, language, rellglon, polltlcal or other opinion, national, ethnic or

®

socfal origin, economic position, physical Impediments, the birth or any other condition of the
chlld, his/her parents or legal representatives taking states parties all appropriate measures to
ensure the protect1on of the chlld, asalnst any form of discrimination or punishment for cause of
the condition, activities, the opinions expressed or bellefs of their parents, guardians or famlly
members, and thus a series of artldes whose content eminently search for all llghts and without a
doubt safeguard the development of children In their physlcal aspects, mental and emotional In a
harmonious way and Integral, but the most Important thing Is It fs precisely within the entire body
of rights that the less you corresponds, Is established In artlde 12 and 13 of the Convention

already cited above.
By virtue of the foregoing, the occupied the documents exhibited upon reason that bv its receipt
thereof In the facts and In Jts opportunity flied the present case, as total and deffnltlvely dosed.
And In compliance with the circular 23/2010 of the twenty-three of March of this year and general
arrangements 10-07/2005, 31-35/2009 and 5-32/20009 Issued by the Plenary Session of the
Council of the Judiciary of the Federal District and In terms of article 28 of the Regulation of the
Institutional system of flies of the Superior Court of Justice and the Council of the Judiciary of the
Federal Dlstrfct; ft Is also brought to the attention of the parties that this dossier and documents
that are In the same and which have been exhibited as a basis the action and as evidence are
susceptible to destruction; the above once the end of this procedure by which the parties must go
to this Court to request the return of their documents within the tenn of SIX MONTHS from that
takes effect this provided, leaving because of their receipt. Please contact the above to the parties
and to interested parties by judlclal Bullettn In terms of article 114 last part of the Code of Clv11
Procedure. NOTIFlm. As well as provided and sl1nlng the C Judge thirty-sixth of the Family, Mr.
JORGE RODRIGUEZ MURILLO assisted by the Secretariat of Agreements 11 B" Martha Mellda
Rodriguez Mendoza that authorizes and attests to whet ocurred.

./

Translator Certification
lune 24, 2013
-·

Elizabeth M Robles
Provo UT 84601

nzmrobles@gmall.com
To Whom It May Concern:
This certificate hereby verifies that the accompanying translation has been prepared by
a certified translator. I, Ellzabeth M Robles, am the Certlfted Translator. I am fluent ln
both English and Spanish and I certify that the English language translation of the
attached document Is a true and correct translation of the Spanish language portion of
the document. This certificate Is signed attesting to the translation having been
undertaken with quality and attention. It accurately represents the meaning of the
source text, to the best of my ablllty.

~Printed Name: Ellzabe h M Robles

Translator Certification
June 24, 2013
Elizabeth M Robles
Provo UT 84601

11zmrobles@gma11,com

To Whom It May Concern:
This certificate hereby verlfles that the accompanying translation has been prepared by
a certified translator. I, Elizabeth M Robles, am the Certified Translator. I am fluent in
both English and Spanish and I certify that the English language translation of the
attached document Is a true and correct translation of the Spanish language portion of
the document. This certificate Is signed attesting to the translatlon having been
undertaken with quallty and attention. It accurately represents the meaning of the
source text, to the best of my ability.
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At left margin appear two (2) rubber seals r
Superior Court of Justice for the Federal Di
The United Mexican States (National Embt
.Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth Court
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Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF begin i g-lnstance: Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth
Court. File: 1472/2007. Clerk: "B". Dee : resolution published on February 8, 2013.
Signatory: JF36SB. NAS: ... (illegible text).

-

Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF begin I g-lnstance: Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth
Court. File: 1472/2007. Clerk: 11 811 • Dee : resolution published on February 8, 2013.
Signatory: JF36J. NAS: 5109-30 ... (illegible t xt).

Mexico City, Federal District, February 08,
With these· records, note is given again. a taking into consideration that Justice
must be prompt and expeditious, and i
rder to duly fulfill with congruence
principle to prevail in court procedures, wi in the sense that once be noted any
unwillingness error, it must be corrected, i order to not prevail in it; therefor.a, in
such circumstance and attending that in ev d nee within records it is seen, that Mr.
JUAN-PABLO MATAS--VIDAL, in brief file
n October 11 2007 at Civil-Domestic
Common Parties Clerkship, sued from S AN-CONSUELO LIBBEY-AGUILERA
within Ordinary Proceedings, Necessary i orce as main action, as well several
considerations; notwithstanding the forego, g, Mr. JUAN-PABLO MATA$-VIDAL,
again brought a No-Fault Divorce v sus SUSAN-CONSUELO LIBBEYAGUILERA, which was established under mber 1529/2010, at Domestic Affairs
Twenty-Fourth Court of this Honorable Cou as contained in certified copies which
were sent to the Head of this Court! where is further noticed that at hearing held
on November 25, 2010. it was pronounce
solution that proceeded according to
the Law, wherein there were dissolved ma age bonds and further there were left
in safe their rights so that within corre ponding incidental means they may
enforced whatever may correspond in his r hts related to commitment motion and
counter-motion; therefore, in such circu s ance and attending to what is was
mentioned in previous lines, the main sui action subject matter herein was the
necessary divorce. by proving that such a i n was exercised by said plaintiff and_
further executed by another Judge, since i must not be unaware that marriage
.
affidavit which is contained at the records ( age 435), there is the corresponding
.';}'i>.\J ~lLL~
ording to marriage bonds dissolution, n such event we have that the action
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subject matter was precisely dissolving m · ·age bonds joining them, since upon
having upheld the main action in another urt, what proceeds is to SET ASIDE
THE ACTING SUIT since even though laintiff demanded several accessory
considerations, we must not lose sight at said attached considerations are
consequence of main action; therefore, th have same procedural chance than
main action, thereto joined that this Judg s legally hindered to amend litis and
decree or resolve related to issues that e merely accessory, he Intended to
enforce them as autonomous rights, circ stance which does not hinder that,
subsequently, he may claim as autonom s rights with final kind; as a result,
EACH AND ALL TEMP9RARY MEAS · ES ARE SET WITH NO. LON.GER
EFFECTS pronounced during procedural mplications, such as: TEMPORARY
GUARD AND CUSTODY for minor childre
ANTIAGO and RODRIGO surnamed
MATAS-LIBBEY in favor of SUSAN-CO UELO LIBBEY~AGUILERA; as well
TEMPORARY ALIMONY decreed in fa r of SUSAN-CONSUELO LIBBEYAGUILERA and for minors SANTIAG
and RODRIGO surnamed MATASLIBBEY in charge of JUAN-PABLO MAT -VIDAL; TEMPORARY REGIME FOR
VISITS AND LIVING-TOGETHER in favo f JUAN.PABLO MATAS-VIDAL with
his minors children SANTIAGO and R(?D IGO surnamed MATAS-LIBBEY; and
USE OF FAMILY DWELLING in favor · Mrs. SUSAN-CONSUELO -LIBBEYAGUILERA and her mentioned children, hich were decreed on interlocutory
judgment dated December 14. 2007, mod· i din judgment dated May 7, 2008, by
H. Third Domestic Chamber of this H.
urt, as well several variations dated
October 22, 2008, pronounced by same thority upon fulfillment to enforceable
judgment pronounced by Ninth District Jud for Civil Affairs at the Federal District.
Now, with the understanding that said p~ r ative may be enforceable at means
and manners in accordance with the La as it may proceed before competent
authority therefore, and before Citizen Ju g as might it may correspond by shift,
with the understanding that at any time it ould be safe kept the superior interest
of their minor children, since in accordan with provisions contained in Article 4th
of the Constitution, the Convention on e Rights of the Child, the Law for
Protection of Boys, Girls, and Teenagers, d the Law on the Rights of Boys and
Girls, children are entitled to a family life i armony, to be loved and respected by
their parents and to a healthy living-toget r with both, maximum that is in them
wherein it should fall preferential appl tion of the law, understanding for
preference the circumstance in which it is xalted minors interest upon any other,
~=~and given the importance of interests whic his kind of subjective right safeguards,
~ ~ILL~
ich it is precisely, the relationship be en parents and children. generator of
J>1j_ : ,.:«i'Gwrocal rights and duties. always con e ed in function of children coverage;
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subjective right which has as a characteri
to be a duty and an obligation from
which cannot be excused and the same s uld be personally performed, since it
represents a positive duty of continuous I pse, who demands and requires an
efficient and constant deployment of a beh ·or which should fill the patria potestas
commitment, wherein parents are bound to I ok after their children, to have them in
their company, to nourish them, to educat them and to procure them an integral
fonnation, since "patria potestas not only i plies rights, but also duties, over all,
interest and protection for minor childre ., therefore, it is necessary to refer to
Enacted Decree upon Rights of the Child, ublished at the Official Gazette of the
Federation on January 25, 1991, which in me manner, the Undersigned expects
that both parties may understand, as think
and rational parties as they are, and
analyze it taking conscious of damage
ich they are causing to their minor
children, mainly outstanding that: "-... th amily, as society's fundamental group
and natural means for growth and welfare all of its members and in special their
children, should receive necessary prote tion and attendance in order to plainly
assume their responsibility within comm n ty; also acknowledging that, for plain
and harmonic personality development, th hild should grow within family sinus in
a happiness, love and understanding en i nment; and taking into consideration
that child should_ be plainly prepared for a independent life within society and be
educated under ideals spirit, ... ;n furtherm e, having present that, as set forth in
the Statement on the Rights of the Child, t e child due to his lack of physical and
mental wisdom, needs special attention a d care, including duly legal protection as
before as after- birth;" it is resolved in sai Convention situations which precisely
come to protect superior interest of m or children in whom should fall the
preferential application of the law, Conven i n in which it is understood as child any
human being minor of eighteen ye~rs old s provides for Article 1, furthermore, is
seen from next number that included ·ghts at said Convention assure its
application to each child subject to its juri iction without distinction, independently
of race, color, sex, language, religion, olitical opinion or of any other kind,
national, ethnic or social origin, economi I position, physical impediments, birth or
any other condition if the child, his parentl; or legal representatives, States Parties
taking all proper measures to secure mi ~ protection, against any discrimination
or punishment manner because of conditi reason. activities, expressed opinions
or believes of their parents, guardianship or relatives, and so a series of articles
whose content eminently seek in every spect and without any discussion to
safeguard development of said minor c ildren in their physical, mental and
~=~
~ ~ u.,L.t~ motional aspect in an integral and har
nic manner, but the most important is
11
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precisely within all rights pile that may co
established in Articles 12 and 13 of the afor

rJ;

spond to minor child, is the content
entioned Convention.

In view of the foregoing, be returned produ d documents, previous receipt which
should be in the records, and in its proper t e be archived this present issue as
entirely and finally concluded. And in lfillment of circular number 23/2010
dated March 23 of this year and in gener I resolutions numbers 10-07/2005, 3135/2009 and 5-32/2009, issued by Plenu of Judicature Board for the Federal
District and under provisions contained in
icle 28 of Rulings for Institutional
System of Archives of the Superior C~u . f Justice and Judicature Board for
the Federal District; __
it__i__
s__h__e__r___
eb_.___in__fi_o__
r ....;,-+=---::__,;;:.;._-,;:;.;::~~~:...,;;...----.;_::~-=:.::.:
deeds in it and that have been roduced
action basis and as evidence are
susceptible of destruction, the foregoing nee these proceedings be over, the
interested parties should appear· at this
urt to apply for devolution of their
documents within a SIX-MONTH term, co n ed as of the date wherein becomes
enforceable this interlocutory jud entl leaving the corresponding
acknowledgment receipt. The foregoing e communicated to the parties or
interested ones through Judicial Bulletin u
r provisions contained in Article 114
last part of the Code of Civil Procedures. B NOTIFIED. It was decreed and signs
the Citizen Thirty-Sixth Judge for Do
tic Affairs, JORGE RODRIGUEZMURILLO, ATTORNEY, with· attendance f Resolutions Clerk "8 11 , MarthaMelida Rodriguez-Mendoza, Attorney, w o authorizes and attests of the act.
On the left and superior margin appear two ) rubber seals reading:
Superior Court of Justice for the Federal D~ ·ct- Mexico
The United Mexican States (National Embl )
Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth Court
On the inferior margin appear two illegible s
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Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF ending-

(An electronic chain)

-

Electronic signature SICORfTSJDF ending

(An electronic chain)

On Judicial Bulletin No. 24 correspondin to February 08, 2013 it was made
publication by Law. For the records. On ebruary 11, 2013 previous summons
became enforceable.
On the right inferior margin appear two (2)
ber seals reading:
Superior Court of Justice for the Federal Di t ict- Mexico
The United Mexican States (National Embl )
Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth Court

*"**"'*****
Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF begl n ng-lnstance: Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth
Court. File: 1472/2007. Clerk: '!B11 • De : resolution published on March 05 2013.
Signatory: JF36SB. NAS: 5109-3158-5415- 63-464.
-

Electronic signature SICORfTSJDF beginnl -Instance: Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth
Court. File: 1472/2007. Clerk: Bq. Deed: r s lutfon published on February 8, 2013.
Signatory: JF36SB. NAS: 5109-3158-5415- 63--464.
11

INCAUSED DIVORCE, MODIFICATION
OF GUARDIANSHI

EMPORARY MEASURES, CHANGE
AND CUSTODY (By its abbreviations)

FILE: 1472/07
THE CLERK HEREBY CERTIFIES AND
ESTS: That the EIG~T-DAY granted
term to appe·at the resolution dated Fe ary 08 of this year,: runs from the
TWELVE THROUGH THE TWENTY- E DAY OF FEBRUARY 2013.
I
CERTIFY. Mexico City, Federal District, a ch 04, 2013.

(An illegible signature)
Seen previous certification, it is

Page S of7

•

(ija·

[Logo]
Superior Court of
Justice for the
Federal District

Superior Court o ustice for the Federal District
"Judicial City a Consolidation of Oral Suits.
Resolving i r Social Order and Peace"
Domestic
airs Thirty-Sixth Court

them. Be notified. Issued and signed by tizen Thirty-Sixth Judge for Domestic
Affairs, with attendance of Resolutions Cler B", who authorizes and attests.
(Two illegible signatures}

-

Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF ending

{An electronic chain)

Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF ending

(An electronic chain)

on· Judicial Bulletin No. 41 correspond n to March 05, 2013 it was made
publication by Law. For the records.
March 06, 2013 previous summons
became enforceable. For the records.
On the right inferior and left margin appear o (2) rubber seals reading:
Superior Court of Justice for the Federal Di rict - Mexico
The United Mexican States (National Embl )
Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth Court

*****
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CITIZEN

IGUEZ-MENDOZA,

MARTHA-MELIDA

RESOLUTIONS CLERK "8

11

FOR THIR

ATTORNEY,

-SIXTH COURT FOR DOMESTIC

AFFAIRS FOR THE FEDERAL DISTRICT,

EREBY

GERTI
THESE PHOTOCOPIES FAITHFULLY

REE TO EACH AND ·ALL OF ITS

PARTS WHICH ARE AT NECESSARY DIV RCE CIVIL ORDINARY SUIT, FILED
i

BY

MATAS-VIDAL

JUAN-PABLO

VE

US

LIBBEY-AGUILERA

SUSAN-

CONSUELO, WITH FILE NUMBER 1472/

07, ARE ISSUED IN FULFILLMENT

OF DECREED IN WRIT DATED MAR

04, 2013, COMPRISED OF FIVE

USEFUL PAGES, DULY SEALED, CO

ARED AND SIGNED. ISSUED IN

MEXICO CITY, FEDERAL DISTRICT, ON

CITIZEN RESOLUTI NS CLERK "B"
(An illegible i nature)

MARTHA-MELIDA RODRIGU

-MENDOZA, ATTOR~EY

On the right inferior and left margin appear
Superior Court of Justice for the Federal Di
The United Mexican States (National Embl
Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth Court

o (2) rubber seals reading:
·ct- Mexico
)

****"'*****

I, Miguel Villalobos, Expert Translator, her y C E RT I F Y: Tharthe foregoing is
a true and accurate translation into Englis of the document in Spanish language
produced to me: Judgment Issued by h ·rty-Sixth Court for Domestic Affairs,
related to file 1472/2007 in connection witl Necessary Divorce Proceedings filed
by JPMV Vs SCLA, as well certification
ed by Resolutions Clem "B 11 of ThirtySixth Court for Domestic Affairs for th Federal District, to the best of my
knowledge.

,sf

AND FOR ALL LEGAL PURPOSES AS NTERESTED PARTIES MAY DEEM
ADVISABLE, I HEREBY ISSUE THIS
ERTIFICATION IN MEXICO CITY,
FEDERAL DISTRICT, ON MAY 17, 2013.
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- - - Dada nueva cu~t con los presentes autos, y tom
qua la J_ustfcia debe r pronta y expedita, ya fin de
plir cabalmente con
el princlplo de cong e cla que debe prevalecer en a aclones judlclales, en
el sentido de qua
vez qua se advlerte algun rror lnvoluntario, debe
correglrse, para no p evalecer en el mismo, por · qua en tal tesitura y
atendiendo a que d
nstanclas de autos se ad rte, qua el senor JUAN
PABLO MATAS VID , medlante escrito present · o el.once de octubre de
dos mil slete, en la
clalfa de Partes Com(m lvil-Famlliar, demand6 de
SUSAN CONSUEL
IBBEY AGUILERA, en I vra Ordinarta Civil, come
acci6n principal el I orcio Necesario asf com diversas prestaciones; no
obstante lo anterfor1 I sefior JUAN PABLO ATAS VIDAi., nuevamente
lnstaur6 julclo de I
de SUSAN CONSUELO
LIBBEY AGUILERA1 I cual se radico bajo I numero 1529/2010, en el
Juzgado Vigeslmo C rto de lo Familiar de es H. Tribunal, segun consta de
las coplas certJficada ue fueron remitidas po el Titular de dicho Juzgado, de
las que lnoluso ade a se advlerte que en a dlencla de fecha velntlclnco de
novi~mbre del afto d mll dlez, se dlct6 la
oluci6n que conforme a derecho
procedi6. en la cual
dlsolvl6 el vinculo
trlmon~I y ademas se dejaron a
salvo sus derechos
dental correspondiente hlcieran
valer lo que a su erecho correspond en relacl6n a la propuesta y
contrapropuesta de
venlo, por lo que n tal tesltura y atendlendo a que
coma se puntuallz6 .n lrneas anterfores I accfon prfnclpal del Julclo que nos
ocupa lo fue el dlvo
necesario, por lo ue al estar demostrado que dlcha
acci6n fue ejercitad
or el mlsmo act r e Incluso ejecutada por diverso
Juzgador, pues no d e pasar desapercl ldo que del atestado de matrimonlo
qu~ obra en actuacio
(foja 435), con ta la lnscripci6n correspondlente a la
disolucl6n del vincul
atrimonlal, en
o case tenemos qua el objeto de su
acci6n era precisam te la de disolve el vlnculo matrimonial que las une,
·pues al haber p
principal en dlverso . juzgado, lo
procedente es .!:!.Et!IOJ:14iW1..11U:1.U.nia.Ji~!IL\!.IL!id.!!ILEii.LL!ill.W~!lln...a!at..LW!.t!. pues
aun y cuando el
versas prestacrones accesorias, no
debemos perder de t ta que dlchas
tenslones anexas son con$ecuencla
de la accl6n principal or ende corren a misma suerte procesal que la accfon
prlmlgenla. ello aun o a que este uzgador se encuentra jurfdicamente
impedido para variar I lltls y decretar o resolver respecto de cuestiones que
son meramente a
arias, prate di6 hacerlas valer como derechos
aut6nomos, clrcuns n la que n~:r impl e que posteriormente pueda reclamar •
come derechos aut6 mos con cara tar de definitive; por consigulenie SE
DEJAN SIN EFEC S TODAS
CADA UNA DE LAS MEDIDAS

.

PROVISIONALES d

de los menores
TSJOF/Glcor

/

~

(ii

Mexico, Distrlto Fe e al a ocho de febrero del ano dos

'!

iJ

Paglna 1 d~ J
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RODRIGO de spell! ,s MATAS LIBBEY a favor de SUSAN CONSUELO
LIBBEY AGUIL
; as( coma la PENSION ALIMENTICIA PROVISIONAL

decretada a favor e SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY AGUILERA y de las
menores SANTIAG
· RODRIGO de apellidos MATAS LIBBEY a cargo de
JUAN PABLO MAT VIDAL; el REGIMEN DE VISITAS Y CONVIVENCIAS
PROVISIONAL a fa r de JUAN PABLO MATAS VIDAL con sus menores
hijos SANTIAGO y
DRIGO oe apellldos MATAS LIBBEY; y el USO OE LA
VIVIENDA FAMILI
a favor de la senora SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY
AGUILERA y de
c!tados infantes, las cuales fueron decretadas en
del catorce de diciembre de dos mil siete, mod;ficada
de mayo de dos mil ocho, por la H. Tercar.3 Sala
en sentencla dei sl
Famlllar de este H. bunal, asf coma la diversa variaci6n de fecha ve:ntid6s
de octubre de dos ii ocho, realizada por la misma autoridad en cumplimiento
a la ejecutoria pron n ada por el Juez Novena de Oistrito en Materia Civil en
el Dlstrito Federal. h ra blen, en el entendldo de que dichas prerrogatiYas las
podran hacer valer n la via y forma que en derecho procada ante la ali\oridad
competente para el o y ante el C. Juez que por tumo le corresponda. en el
entendido de que e
do memento se debera salvaguardar el interes superior
de sus menores hij s ~da vez que conforme a lo dispuesto por el artlculo 4•
Constitucional, la
nvenci6n de los derechos del Nino, la Ley ~ara la
Proteccl6n de las N i\ s, Nirias y Adolecentes, y la Ley de los Derechor.. de las
NIHos.y de las Nina , las nli\os tienen derecho a una vlda famlllar en ennonla,
a ser querldos y r s etado por sus padres y a una sana· convlven;;ia con
ambos, maxima qu s en ellos en donde d~w~r I~ apllcac!6n prnferente
del derecho, enten I a par preferenci~
~ . . · ~ ~ l~-, n que se e:<alte el
lnteres de los men r s sobre cualquie
.~~
·; ...
cendencia de •los
,._.,,
lntereses que sa v guarda este
jetlvo, que es
I

~t,- -~
O

:r,

precisamente la r I cl6n entre padr m•i~l'l'llU
, ...~~ ora de reciprocos
derechos y deberel concebldo~ siemp ~~!liK:j . pel amparo de los hljos;
derecho subjetivo
tlene
la de ser un debor una
obligaci6n de la u I no pueden ·
.
el mismo debe reali~rse

te

PI

c~~la

personalmente,
e representa u ~ P , , tivo de tracto continua, que
exlge y requlere u~espllegue eficaz y constante de una conducta qua Ilene
el cometido de la tria potestad, en donde las padres tienen oblig;.ci6n de
velar par sus hij s tenertos en su companla, alimentar1os, edur.:artos y
procurartes una fo~ acl6n Integral, ya que "la patria potestad, impliec;
derechos, slno ta ~leri deberes, sabre todo, el interes y protecci6n · ,. :s
menores, es por
que se hace necesario aludir al Decreto Pro ' ~-~~
sabre los Derechof el Nino, Publicado en el Diario Oficial de la Fed
·~1
veinticlnco de ene'f. e mil noveoientos noventa y uno, que de alguna
Suscrito espera 11, guen a comprender ambas partes coma ~ ...

nq ~-

• ·:. •._ ! . -

. .. • .. -:
. ,...
~

:~.

. :-. '
•;,

e)11

n..~ .

.

y

l"l

•:: >

_as

f~n~

pensantes y racloi les que son lo analicen tomando concienci~~
que esta causan o a sus menores hijos, destacando princlpalme~l~~que:
·-... la familia, c, o grupo fundamental de la sociedad y media natural para
el crecimlento y e lenestar de todos sus mlernbros y en particular de sus
nines, debe recibl~ a proteccl6n y asistencia necesarias para poder asurn:r
plenamente sus Je ponsabilidades dentro de la comunidad; re!c00c-.'c.1do

WmblOn que el nr pa,a el pleno :~:~loso desarrollo de su pers::::!:a:l:

i

... ; i
_\ IH~;., VISTRl'W H:Ol!:l-!,U,

· . .,<" lo., J11~·,•;us Orale.t,
fl

Pu: S~ial"

Familiar

/

O

i TillBUNAl.

Jr;_:.de $USAN CONSUELO
IME.Nf/lCIA PROVISIONAL
,BEY. ~GUILERA y de los
~ATASj LIBBEY a cargo de
/ISITAS Y CONVIVENCIAS
.S VID~L con sus menores
S LIB-EV; y el USO DE LA
SAN .CONSUELO LIBBEY
ales fu'.eron decretadas en
:fe dos !mil siete, modificada
io, .P~ la H. Tercera Sala
varia(?qn de fecha veintid6s
9 autorfldad en cumplimiento
, Dlstrlt~ en Materla Clvll en
que dichas prerrogatlvas las
,o pro~a ante la autoridad
tumo I~ corresponds, en el
,aguardar el interes superior
· dlspue:sto par el artfculo 4°
del ·Nino, la Ley para la
Ley de~los Derechos de los
na vida1famiUar en armonfa,
una sana convivencia con
:aer la ~pll~6n preferente
;tancla ien_ .<iue se exalte el
1da la t~ct-9noia de los
,recho :sNfc.it,..ti.vo, que es
generadora de recfprocos
6n del ~mparo.de los hljos;
5 la d~ ser un deber una
el miSfTIO debe realizarse
tfvo de tracto continua, que
de un~ conducta que Ilene
ladres tienen obligaci6n de
alimentarfos, educarlos y
~a p~te~d. implica no,~.
mteres ,y protecci6n •
1
lir al De'creto Pro
~"'- ·
o Oficfal de la Fed
·
..
uno, qu~ de alguna
s part~s como pe,ft!a,.,!11~;
nando conciencia, ~ daiicr,:
1cando prfncipalme~i~~~~~cledad ¥medfo natural para
bros y en particular de sus
:esarla~ para poder asumir
I comunidad; reconociendo
sarrollo ae su personalidad,
P,gina 2 do '4 ,.. •

SUPERIOR.
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/
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debe crecer en el sen e la familia en un ambfente de fellcldad, a
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AddendumF
No-Fault Decree of Divorce Dated
11/25/2010

Traaslatloa

~010, Mexi~ Independence Bicentennial
And Centennial of the Mexican Revolution"

Mexico City., Federal District, at 11:30 A.M. on November 25, 20101 time set for the hearing
referred to In Article 272 B of1he Code of Civil Procedure, before RODRJOO ALBERTO
HACES-RODRJOUBZ, 241h acting family Judge, assisted by the conclliation clerk by operatfon
of law, XOCHITL AV11'1A-RUIZ, who attests to the records of1he DIVORCE
PROCEEDINGS filed by MATAs-VIDAL JUAN PABLO against LIBBEY-AGUILERA
SUSAN CONSUELO under case number 1S29/2010, appeared both MATAS-VIDAL JUAN

PABLO and LIBBEY AGUILERA SUSAN CONSUELO, who jdentify themselves, respectively

(

with their voter's identification cards, folio numtien 7849357 and 9643160, issued by lhe Federal
Election Institute; the acting family judge hereby certifies to have seen such docwnents and
returned them to the interested parlles. THE BEARING WAS FORMALLY OPBN:ED BY
THE COURT: Thereupon, the standing of the spouses Is analyzed whereby the petitioner has
legal standing as shown In hls initial petition for divorce and the record of the Bureau of Vital
Statistics submitted and the divorcing spouse through the summons served by the process server
ofthejurisdicdon on September 20, 2010, as well as the answer to such petition filed with this
Court on October 12, 20 JO. Then. the conclliatlon stage was opened to analyze the natural
consequences arisina from the dissolution of the bonds of marriage and. in the exercise of the
right to speak, both parties stated that no settlement may be reached, since the legal status of their
minor children whose names are SANTIAGO and RODRIGO, both of MATAS-LmBEY last
name, are subject to litigation with the 36'11 Mexico City Family Court. Consequently, a request
is hereby made to continue processing the petition for divorce. THE COURT ADJOURNS the
hearing and after having analyzed the case records, based on the provisions of Articles 287 of the
Civil Code, hereby issues the following decree:
·J

MEXICO CITY, FEDERAL DISTRICT, NOVEMBER 25t 2010, THIS CASE having come
to be decided and taking into account that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
petition for divorce filed by MATAS-VIDAL JUAN PABLO against LmBEY-AGUJLERA
SUSAN CONSUELO under case number 1529/2010, pursuant to the provisions of Articles J56
(XII) and 1S9 of the Code ofCMI Procedwe for the Federal District, maccordance with Points I
and II, end Articles 48 (III) and 52 (II) of the Orsanic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice_ In
addition to the fact that the existence of the maniase and that the standing of the parties are duly
supported with a certified copy of their marriage certificate, an official documeat which probative
value Is fully acknowledged. according to Articles 39 and SO of the Civil Code, in coMectfon
with Articles 327 (IV) and 403 of said Code and, since the provisions of Article 266 of the Civil
Code for the Federal District, which reads as follows:
"Divorce dl#o/tJa the marital bonds nnd each spoue
Dl,orcs ,n,o, be requested bJ' an,• onfl or 6olh qomes,

a free

to ramnn:,,.

upon a pslltlflnjllsd wlt/1

a t:aurt oflaw, stating suc/1 sporae'6 dultt1 not to continue In tl,e marriage, nnd

/

tL

Mana r1el Socorro Munsvo Metcho1

Perno Traduclor a:,to el
Tribunal Superior do Juallcia del
DT

I~

2
wltbolll tl,s nnd to dale a ground for dharce, provided, nt least one year luu
e/apled nnce the 1t1t1rrloga:"

;

I

I

I

apply to this case. 1he bonds of marriage between MATAS-VIDAL JUAN PABLO and
LIBBEY-AGUILERA SUSANA CONSUELO are hereby dissolved, whlob marriage was
entered Into In Mexico City, Federal District. under the SBPARATION PR.OPBRTY SYSTEM
on June 26, J999, with the following registration data: ENTITY 09, DISTRICT 01, BURBAU
17, CERTIFICATE NO. 436, YEAR 1999, TYPB MA. Both parties are now free to remarry,
with no Umltadons. Also, both parties hereby state their conformity with the decree issued in this
cue and, therefore, the decree Is hereby declared as final and conclusive for all legal purposes.
ACCOJdlngly, an official communication to the Dl~ctor ~r the Bmeau ofVllal Statistics of this
City is ordered to be remitted so that the Director may make the respective annotations iefened to
in Article 29 J of the ct vii Code. With respect to the proposal and counterproposal of a
settlement agreement submitted by the parties, their rights me left intact so that. If any, they may
exercise their rights by fllfns an ancillary proceeding. A set or a certified copy of this hearing Is
issued to each of the parties, prior receipt of the payment and explanation of the reason for
obtaining such copy. Thereupon, the hearing ls adjourned at 12: 1S P.M. on the date, month and
year set forth above, and the parties involved have hereunto set their hand, along with the Judge
and the concWatlon c!er)4 who attest this instrument.

~ t11a underafanltd, Ma. del Socano Munlve Salcbor, SPANlmueNGUSH axpa,t tranafatar, heleby certffrihat,
ID1118Nltaf1111' bov.!edpaml llallil~ U.,fOl8&0kla lalnlaad
lllonaOIP&a&aftlm
c=umentrn 0ta~ 1ana11a;e whfl:fl tadacbed hereto.

Mmlco cu,, Duc:embar s, 2010.

Cllll'lllllll:,::a•
tJ[_____
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Addendu1n G
Utah Code§ 78B-13-102 (definitions)
Utah Code§ 78B-13-110 (communication between courts)
Utah Code§ 78B-13-112 (cooperation between courts)
Utah Code § 78B-13-201 (initial jurisdiction)
Utah Code§ 78B-13-206 (simultaneous proceedings)
Utah Code § 78B-13-208 (jurisdiction declined by reason of
conduct)
Utah Code§ 78B-13-209 (Information to be submitted to court)

Utah Code

788-13-102 Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision.
(2) "Child" means an individual under 18 years of age and not married.
(3) "Child custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for
the legal custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a child. The term includes
a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an order
relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.
(4) "Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or
parent-time with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce,
separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights,
and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The term does not
include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement
under Part 3, Enforcement.
(5) "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a state to establish, enforce, or modify a
child custody determination.
(7) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent
for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody
proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in
which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary
absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.
(8) "Initial determination" means the first child custody determination concerning a particular child.
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child custody determination for which
enforcement is sought under this chapter.
(10) "Issuing state" means the state in which a child custody determination is made.
(11) "Modification" means a child custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is
otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is
made by the court that made the previous determination.
(12) "Person" includes government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any
other legal or commercial entity.
(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who:
(a) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of six consecutive
months, including any temporary absence, within one year immediately before the
commencement of a child custody proceeding; and
(b) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody under the law of
this state.
(14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a child.
(15) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United
States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.
(16) "Tribe" means an Indian tribe, or band, or Alaskan Native village which is recognized by
federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
(17) "Writ of assistance" means an order issued by a court authorizing law enforcement officers to
take physical custody of a child.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Utah Code

788-13-11 O Communication between courts.
(1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding
arising under this chapter.
(2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties are not able
to participate in the communication, the parties shall be given the opportunity to present facts
and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.
(3) A communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, and similar matters
may occur without informing the parties. A record need not be made of t!Jat communication.
(4) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a record shall be made of the communication. The
parties shall be informed promptly of the communication and granted access to the record.
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible
medium or that which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
perceivable form. A record includes notes or transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a
conference call between the courts, an electronic recording of a telephone call, a memorandum
or an electronic record of the communication between the courts, or a memorandum or an
electronic record made by a court after the communication.

Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Utah Code

788-13-112 Cooperation between courts -- Preservation of records.
(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state to:
(a) hold an evidentiary hearing;
{b) order a person to produce or give evidence under procedures of that state;
(c) order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a child involved in a pending
proceeding;
(d) forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of the record of the hearing,
the evidence otherwise pres_ented, and any evaluation prepared in compliance with the
request; and
(e) order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having physical custody of the child
to appear in the proceeding with or without the child.
(2) Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may:
(a) hold a hearing or enter an order described in Subsection (1 ); or
(b) order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a custody proceeding in
another state.
(3) A court of this state may condition compliance with a request under Subsection (2)(b) upon
assurance by the other state that travel and other necessary expenses will be advanced or
reimbursed. If the person who has physical custody of the child cannot be served or fails to
obey the order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a warrant of arrest
against the person to secure his appearance with the child in the other state.
(4) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under Subsections (1) and (2)
may be assessed against the parties according to the law of this state.
(5) A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records of hearings,
evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child custody proceeding until the
child attains 18 years of age. Upon appropriate request by a court or law enforcement official of
another state, the court shall forward a certified copy of these records.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Utah Code

788-13-201 Initial child custody jurisdiction.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78B-13-204, a court of this state has jurisdiction to
make an initial child custody determination only if:
(a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding,
or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the
proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent
continues to live in this state;
(b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subsection (1 )(a}, or a court of the
home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the
more appropriate forum under Section 78B-13-207 or 78B-13-208; and
(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a
parent have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training,
and personal relationships;
(c) all courts having jurisdiction under Subsection (1 )(a) or (b) have declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine
the custody of the child under Section 78B-13-207 or 78B-13-208; or
(d) no state would have jurisdiction under Subsection (1 )(a), (b ), or (c).
(2) Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a
court of this state.
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is neither necessary nor
sufficient to make a child custody determination.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Utah Code

788-13-206 Simultaneous proceedings.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 788-13-204, a court of this state may not exercise
its jurisdiction under this chapter if at the time of the commencement of the proceeding a
proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been previously commenced in a court
of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the
proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of
this state is a more convenient forum under Section 788-13-207.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 788-13-204, a court of this state, before_ hearing
a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other information
supplied by the parties pursuant to Section 788-13-209. If the court determines that a child
custody proceeding was previously commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction
substantially in accordance with this chapter, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding
and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction
substantially in accordance with this chapter does not determine that the court of this state is a
more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding.
(3) In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this state shall determine
whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been commenced in another state. If a
proceeding to enforce a child custody determination has been commenced in another state, the
court may:
(a) stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of a court of the other state
enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the proceeding for enforcement;
(b) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or
(c) proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Utah Code

788-13-208 Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 788-13-204 or by other law of this state, if a court of
this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a person invoking the jurisdiction has
engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless:
(a) the parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction;
(b) a court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201 through
788-13-203 determines that this state is a more appropriate forum under Section 788-13-207;
or
(c) no other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201 through 788-13-203.
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (1 ), it may
fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of the child and prevent a repetition of
the wrongful conduct, including staying the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is
commenced in a court having jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201 through 788-13-203.
(3) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines to exercise its
jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (1 ), it shall charge the party invoking the jurisdiction of the
court with necessary and reasonable expenses including costs, communication expenses,
attorney fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care
during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes
that the award would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs, or
expenses against this state except as otherwise provided by law other than this chapter.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Utah Code

788-13-209 Information to be submitted to court.
(1) In a child custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an attached affidavit, shall
give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under oath as to the child's present address,
the places where the child has lived during the last five years, and the names and present
addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or
affidavit shall state whether the party:
(a) has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in any other proceeding
concerning the custody of or parent-time with the child and, if ~o, identify the court, the case
number of the proceeding, and the date of the child custody determination, if any;
(b) knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings for
enforcement and proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination
of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court and the case number and the
nature of the proceeding; and
(c) knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the proceeding who has
physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal custody or physical custody of, or parenttime with, the child and, if so, the names and addresses of those persons.
(2) If the information required by Subsection (1) is not furnished, the court, upon its own motion or
that of a party, may stay the proceeding until the information is furnished.
(3) If the declaration as to any of the items described in Subsection (1) is in the affirmative, the
declarant shall give additional information under oath as required by the court. The court may
examine the parties under oath as to details of the information furnished and other matters
pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.
(4) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in this or any other state
that could affect the current proceeding.
(5) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, safety, or liberty of a
party or child would be put at risk by the disclosure of identifying information, that information
shall be sealed and not disclosed to the other party or the public unless the court orders the
disclosure to be made after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health,
safety, or liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the interest of
justice.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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